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I wish I were in that landscape of yours. It must be similar to the landscape in Norway, which I love.

(Ludwig Wittgenstein, writing to G. H. von Wright in Finland, 13 September 1939)

Introduction

This is a bibliography of (1) Finnish translations of the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein; (2) secondary literature on Wittgenstein written by Finnish scholars; and (3) Finnish translations of secondary literature written by foreign scholars. Items by foreign scholars published in Finland in languages other than Finnish have been left out.

In my work on the bibliography, I have striven for completeness, within reason – even though it would have been tempting to engage in national self-censorship in some cases. Undoubtedly there are omissions, especially regarding newspapers and magazines which are not adequately indexed, but the bulk of Finnish writing on Wittgenstein is certainly covered. (In the cases of writers like Aulis Aarnio or Esa Itkonen, who are deeply influenced by Wittgenstein but have rarely dwelled explicitly on him at length, it has been hard to decide what to include and what to exclude. I hope my decisions were the right ones.)

As could be expected, many of the entries listed are in Finnish or Swedish. However, I have included English abstracts for most of the entries I have been able to examine, except in cases where the subject matter is more or less evident from the title of the item. Authors' abstracts taken from the publications themselves are marked [AA].

I would like to thank the many people who have helped me with this project in one way or another, and especially Mr. Kivi Ketelimäki and Dr. Thomas Wallgren for supplying a number of items from their personal archives.

T. P. Uschanov

Helsinki, October 2002

1. **AALTO, MAIJA, »Descartes ja Wittgensteinin yksityiskieliargumentti», *niin & näin* 7 (2000), 4: 43–47.**

The main target of W.'s private language argument is usually taken to be Cartesianism, but textual evidence shows that the historical Descartes was not committed to the idea of a private language.

2. **AALTO, MAIJA, »Thoughts of the *Tractatus*: Mentalism vs. Non-Mentalism», in Rudolf Haller and Klaus Puhl (eds.), *Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy*, vol. 1 (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2001): 13–21.**

Criticizes the view that the »thoughts» discussed in the *Tractatus* are mental processes giving life to propositional signs. *Pace* the interpretations of Donna Summerfield and Norman Malcolm, the *Tractatus* thoughts are not analogous to the »language of thought» postulated in recent philosophy of mind, but are instead a purely formal concept.

3. **AALTO, MAIJA, »Wittgenstein on the Nature of Religious Belief», in Tapio Korte and Juha Räikkä (eds.), *Philosophical Perspectives: Essays in Honour of Seppo Sajama on His 50th Birthday* (Turku: University of Turku, Department of Philosophy, 2002): 63–82.**

An essay of an introductory nature, discussing both W.'s views on religion and the standard philosophical objections directed at them.

4. **AALTOLA, JUHANI, *Tractatuksen ontologia: peruskäsitteiden jäsentelyä* (Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto, Filosofian laitos, 1979).**

46 p.; ISBN 951-678-153-5.

An elementary exposition of the ontology presented in the *Tractatus*.

5. **AALTOLA, JUHANI, *Merkitys Wittgensteinin myöhäisajattelussa* (Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto, Filosofian laitos, 1979).**
18 p.; ISBN 951-678-154-3.

An elementary exposition of W.'s conception of meaning as use.

6. **AALTOLA, JUHANI, *Merkitys ja opettaminen: kielipeliin kietoutuva teema Wittgensteinilla* (Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto, Filosofian laitos, 1985).**
53 p.; ISBN 951-679-312-6.

Revised and expanded edition of item 5, with special reference to teaching.

7. **AALTOLA, JUHANI, *Merkitys opettamisen ja oppimisen näkökulmasta Wittgensteinin myöhäisfilosofian ja pragmatismien valossa* (Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto, 1989).**
249 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-680-086-6.

A historical and theoretical examination of W.'s notion of meaning with special reference to the activities of teaching and learning. In developing his pragmatic conception of language, W. was influenced by American pragmatism; this came via his reading of James, conversations with Ramsey and association with the Austrian school reform movement.

8. **AALTOLA, MIKA, »Lumottu aika: peli, aika ja kansainvälinen politiikka Wittgensteinin valossa», in Kia Lindroos and Kari Palonen (eds.), *Politiikan aikakirja: ajan politiikan ja politiikan ajan teoretisointia* (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2000): 129–157.**

Using W.'s views about the nature of language, the author examines different conceptions of time as they are manifested in international politics. He goes on to argue that researchers in political science have often emphasized W.'s rule-following considerations at the expense of his insights into the rough, frictional and indeterminate nature of social intercourse.

9. **AARNIO, AULIS, *Legal Reasoning* (Turku: Turun yliopisto, 1977).**
xiii, 355 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-641-462-1.

Numerous references to W.'s views on the nature of language and their implications for the philosophy of law.

10. **AARNIO, AULIS, »Oikeuskielen tulkinta ja ymmärtäminen: näkökulma Wittgensteinin myöhäisfilosofiaan», in Ari Hirvonen and Kaarlo Tuori (eds.), *Oikeus, kieli ja kritiikki* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Julkisoikeuden laitos, 1990): 99–127.**

An application of W.'s later views on linguistic meaning to the interpretation and understanding of legal and juridical language.

11. **AARNIO, AULIS, »A Glance at Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy», in *Reason and Authority: A Treatise on the Dynamic Paradigm of Legal Dogmatics* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997): 106–127.**

Discusses the later W.'s views on the relationship between language and reality as they bear on legal dogmatics.

12. **AARNIO, AULIS, »Oikeusfilosofi kevätjällä», *Oikeus* 28 (1999): 75–77.**

Reply to item 250. By using the example of the Paris standard metre, W. does not seek to undermine the conventional nature of knowledge, as Siltala claims, but to emphasize it. Siltala also ignores W.'s *On Certainty* and its discussion of the status of knowledge.

13. AHONEN, HANNE, »Merkityksen ja ymmärtämisen käsitteet kielessä ja musiikissa: Wittgenstein ja formalismi», *niin & näin* 5 (1998), 3: 26–31.

In both the *Tractatus* and his later writings, W. puts forward a number of views which have interesting parallels with the formalist tradition in musical aesthetics, and especially with the writings of Eduard Hanslick.

14. AIRAKSINEN, TIMO, »Meaning and Knowledge: The Place of Criterion in Epistemology», *Dialectics and Humanism* 8 (1981): 113–122.

Discusses the role of epistemological criteria in analytic philosophy as dealt with by W. and by J. L. Austin. It is unclear whether criteria belong primarily to the field of semantics or to epistemology. The semantic aspect appears more basic than the epistemological one.

15. AIRAKSINEN, TIMO, »On Non-Foundationalistic Theories of Epistemic Justification», *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 19 (1981): 403–412.

Includes analysis of the notion of a »criterion» used by W. in his discussions of the problem of other minds.

16. ANSCOMBE, G. E. M.; RHEES, RUSH; and WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Note», *Mind* 60 (1951): 584. Also published in *Philosophical Review* 60 (1951): 607.

- 16a. ANSCOMBE, G. E. M.; RHEES, RUSH; and WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Letter from Wittgenstein's Literary Executors», in F. A. Flowers III (ed.), *Portraits of Wittgenstein*, vol. 4 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999): 138.

Reprint of item 16.

W.'s designated literary executors express reservations regarding any project of publishing those of his notes that had been circulated privately. They announce the forthcoming publication of *Philosophical Investigations*, a book manuscript which W. left in an almost complete form.

17. ANSCOMBE, G. E. M.; RHEES, RUSH; and WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Notes and News», *Journal of Philosophy* 54 (1957): 484.

The literary executors believe that, for various reasons, the version of W.'s »Notes on Logic» published by Costello in 1957 is unreliable. They also announce the imminent publication of W.'s pre-*Tractatus* notebooks.

18. ANSCOMBE, G. E. M.; RHEES, RUSH; and WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*», *Times Literary Supplement*, 18 February 1965.

The literary executors criticize representatives of C. K. Ogden's estate for refusing them access to W.'s letters to Ogden, and promise to qualify criticisms of Ogden's translation of the *Tractatus* made in their own writings if the letters turn out to prove that these are unfounded.

19. ANSCOMBE, G. E. M.; RHEES, RUSH; and WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*», *Times Literary Supplement*, 9 October 1970.

The literary executors retract item 18 and announce the forthcoming publication of W.'s letters to C. K. Ogden with the consent of Ogden's heirs.

20. APEL, KARL-OTTO, »Wittgenstein ja Heidegger», in Jaakko Hintikka and Lauri Routila (eds.), *Filosofian tila ja tulevaisuus* (Helsinki: Weilin + Göös, 1970): 97–137.

Finnish translation by Sirpa Rossi and Sirpa Routila of »Wittgenstein und Heidegger: Die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein und Sinnlosigkeitsverdacht gegen alle Metaphysik» (1967).

21. BOENDERS, FRANS (ed.), *Over Wittgenstein gesproken* (Baarn: Het Wereldvenster, 1978).
109 p.; ISBN 90-293-9666-0.

Includes Dutch translations of brief 1977 interviews with G. H. von Wright and Jaakko Hintikka.

22. BURMAN, CHRISTIAN et al. (eds.), *Vermischte Blätter in Honour of Lars Hertzberg 11. • 5. • 1993* (Åbo: [s. n.], 1993).
125 p.

An informal *Festschrift* for Lars Hertzberg's fiftieth birthday containing thirty-five short pieces, most of them in the form of letters addressed to him. Finnish contributors writing on W. include Christoffer Gefwert, Tage Kurtén, André Maury and Hans Rosing.

23. BYFÄLT, OLA, »Religion i funktion: spridda tankar inspirerade av den senare Ludwig Wittgenstein», *Sanct Olof* 53 (1999): 101–108.

An essay on W.'s philosophy of religion and the mystical. W.'s significance is that he »gives intellectual legitimation to the belief of the church in the good as the meaning of life».

24. ELOMAA, E., »A Universal Hamlet?», *Nature*, 16 May 1991: 179.

In opposition to J. R. Smythies's suggestion that W. was a paranoid schizophrenic, the author proposes that he should instead be seen as a »universal Hamlet figure of our time«. W.'s remarks on madness in *On Certainty* show that he was aware of the resemblance of philosophy to insanity, and his insights on the subject are comparable to Shakespeare's depiction of madness in *Othello*, *Macbeth* and *Hamlet*.

25. ELOMAA, E., »Wittgenstein's Schizophrenia in Moonlight«, *Medical Hypotheses* 40 (1993): 127–128.

The author suggests sardonically that W.'s remarks on the role of world-pictures in scientific investigation in *On Certainty* give a good characterization of scientific research as a bourgeois profession.

26. GEFWERT, CHRISTOFFER, »Wittgenstein and Turing: The Illusion of Machine Intelligence«, in Antti Hautamäki and Göte Nyman (eds.), *Kognitiotiede ja koneäly: seminaari 20. • 3. • 1991, Helsingin yliopisto* (Helsinki: Suomen tekoälyseura, 1992): 44–63.

From the point of view of W., Alan Turing's discussions of machine intelligence rest on a category mistake involving the Cartesian dichotomy between mind and matter. W.'s remark that Turing's »machines« are really »humans who calculate« is interpreted and defended.

27. GEFWERT, CHRISTOFFER, *Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Mathematics: An Essay in the History of Philosophy* (Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 1994).
xiv, 287 p.; ISBN 952-9616-47-3.

This historical as well as philosophical book deals with W.'s thought on philosophy, mathematics and language in his post-1929 writings. It claims that W. regarded language of mathematics to be transcendental. The book itself covers the following topics: (1) W.'s writings on mathematics during his early years 1912–1921 including his transcendental view of language; (2) A comparison between the respective thoughts of W. and Brouwer; (3) The historical background to W.'s return to Cambridge and post-1929 writings on philosophy and mathematics; (4) W.'s novel post-1929 »method» of philosophy in contrast to the Anti-Realist interpretations; (5) Different aspects (surveyability, etc.) of the language of mathematics when understood as *calculi* (language games); (6) The crucial features of mathematical calculation occurring in W.'s texts on mathematics; (7) W. on the »foundations» of mathematics especially with emphasis on the so-called »consistency problem», »decidability problem» as well as Gödel's incompleteness theorems; and (8) »Wittgenstein on Language, Minds, and Machines» where we investigate his relation to the writings of Alan Turing and the possibility of there existing a genuine »machine intelligence». [AA]

Reviews:

Dummett, Michael, *Journal of Philosophy* 94 (1997): 359–374.

Manfredi, S., *Lingua e stile* 31 (1996): 595–600.

28. GEFWERT, CHRISTOFFER, »Wittgenstein: Is Philosophy Systematic?», in Sami Pihlström, Martti Kuokkanen and Gabriel Sandu (eds.), *Filosofisia tienviittoja Heikki Kanniston 50-vuotispäivän kunniaksi* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Filosofian laitos, 1995): 129–134.

Attributions to W. of various meaning-theoretical intentions, while popular among analytically minded philosophers, are deeply contrary to the spirit of his philosophy. His philosophy was remarkably systematic, but this does not mean that it was theoretical as well.

29. GEFWERT, CHRISTOFFER, *Wittgenstein on Mathematics, Minds and Mental Machines* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).
xx, 349 p.; ISBN 1-84014-308-8.

Revised and expanded edition of item 27. This book investigates W.'s conception of mathematics and philosophy during his career as a philosopher. His early view (1912–1920) of mathematics in the *Tractatus* (and later), can be understood as a constructivist conception in comparison to the »classical» interpretation that has so far been provided. Thus it is not »logistic» in the sense of Frege or Russell. It reminds one of the constructivist view formulated by the mathematician and philosopher Per Martin-Löf. In W.'s view, mathematical calculation turns out to be »transcendental» in its nature. Despite that, it can be classified as constructivist, differing in a number of points from Brouwer's solipsistic view concerning the »foundations» of mathematics. W.'s later post-1929 view retains this conception of mathematics but, in opposition to his position in the *Tractatus*, it explicitly distinguishes the activity of mathematical calculation from the activity of philosophical investigations in different calculations. The book also investigates different aspects of W.'s conception of mathematical calculation. In addition it looks at his denial of the validity of Hilbert's meta-mathematical »research programme» concerning the foundations of mathematics. The result is W.'s denial of the »global» consistency and decision problems as expressing genuine mathematical tasks in mathematics. The author also examines the relationship between Gödel's famous incompleteness theorem and W.'s conception of »openness» of mathematical calculations. In addition he finds that W. denied the existence of conceptually independent »machine (artificial) intelligence» in his texts. [AA]

30. GEFWERT, CHRISTOFFER, *Wittgenstein on Thought, Language and Philosophy: From Theory to Therapy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). xvii, 316 p.; ISBN 0-7546-1214-7.

What was W.'s relation to »theory of meaning» in his post-1937 writings and what was his characterization of »philosophy»? How does »philosophy» in W.'s later writings differ from what is usually accepted in modern academic »analytic» philosophy? This book discusses problems encountered in looking at W.'s texts after 1937, focusing particularly on whether the problem of philosophy amounts to a systematic or a theoretical activity. Arguing that philosophy can be characterized as a form of conceptual investigation, the author aims to demonstrate that a theoretical view does not correspond to W.'s conception of philosophy. For example, philosophy is not transcendental as he thought it was before 1929. Neither is philosophical language universal as W. thought in 1929–1936. Proposing that a philosophical conceptual investigation is analogous to a psychotherapeutical session of Freud, with the common aim to dissolve the conceptual problems in language that haunt us in our everyday life, the author's examination of the post-1937 writings of W. concludes that »philosophical investigation» is a very different activity than that assumed by the logical positivists and others adhering to a theoretical view. [AA]

31. HACKER, P. M. S., *Wittgenstein: ihmislunnosta* (Helsinki: Otava, 2000).
77 p.; ISBN 951-1-16171-7.

Finnish translation by Floora Ruokonen and Risto Vilkkö of *Wittgenstein: On Human Nature* (London: Phoenix, 1997).

32. HALONEN, ILPO, »Kohti parakonsistenssia? Wittgenstein ja ristiriidat», in Sami Pihlström, Martti Kuokkanen and Gabriel Sandu (eds.), *Filosofisia tienviittoja Heikki Kanniston 50-vuotispäivän kunniaksi* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Filosofian laitos, 1995): 135–140.

A discussion of W.'s unorthodox attitude towards contradiction in mathematics and his role as a precursor of contemporary paraconsistent logic.

33. HARDWICK, SAM, »Wittgensteinin ja Mooren dialogi varmuudesta», *Seepia* 5 (2002): 18–19.

A brief discussion of W.'s critique of G. E. Moore in *On Certainty*.

34. HAUKIOJA, JUSSI, *Rule-Following, Response-Dependence and Realism* (Turku: University of Turku, Department of Philosophy, 2000). 169 p.; ISBN 951-29-1642-8.

A discussion of various proposed solutions to the so-called W.ian rule-following paradox, defending Philip Pettit's views on it.

35. HAUKIOJA, JUSSI, »Soames and Zalabardo on Kripke's Wittgenstein», *Grazer philosophische Studien* 64 (2002): 157–173.

Two counter-arguments, given by Scott Soames and José Zalabardo, to Saul Kripke's W.-inspired »normativity» argument against dispositional theories of meaning are evaluated. Both counter-arguments proceed by distinguishing two different readings of Kripke's argumentation, an »epistemological» and a »metaphysical» reading. Two results are established. First, Kripke intended the latter, metaphysical, reading. Second, the counter-arguments presented by Soames and Zalabardo against the metaphysical reading of the argument are both unsuccessful. [AA]

36. HEINIMAA, MARKUS, »'Filosofia terapiana' -metafora Wittgensteinin filosofiassa», *Ajatus* 48 (1991): 152–181.

A close reading of all the known passages in the W. corpus where parallels are drawn between philosophy and therapy. The recurring metaphor of therapy is an apt way of characterizing W.'s view of philosophy as work correcting the misleading impressions made by linguistic forms.

37. HELLING, LENNART, »Filosofi med eller utan förnuff?», *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 10 August 1995.

Reply to item 68. D. Z. Phillips's discussion of the problem of evil in Christianity is intellectually and morally unsatisfactory.

38. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Marx och Wittgenstein», *Häften för kritiska studier* 2 (1969), 7–8: 39–46.

Marx and W. are two philosophers who revolt against the dominant technologico-scientific view of the world. W.'s attack on the empiricist conception of language and his emphasis on the social character of linguistic meaning are both congenial to Marxist philosophy.

39. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Wittgenstein, filosofi», trans. Timo Alanko, *Parnasso* 21 (1971): 501–509.

An introductory essay on W.'s personality and his conception of philosophy.

40. HERTZBERG, LARS, »On the Factual Dependence of the Language Game», in Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), *Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G. H. von Wright* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976): 126–153.

Examines various circumstances in which one may be torn away from the sureness of a language game (*On Certainty* § 617), and more generally the way in which language games are conditioned by facts.

41. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Language, Philosophy and Natural History», *Ajatus* 37 (1978): 328–360.

Discusses the notion of »the natural history of man» in W.'s later philosophy, and the objection that his numerous thought experiments should have been replaced by examples taken from the real world.

42. HERTZBERG, LARS, »On Claiming to Know», in Elisabeth Leinfellner et al. (eds.), *Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1978): 389–392.

In *On Certainty*, W. draws a distinction between two uses of »I know» which the English translation blurs. The following translation is suggested: »'I know it' may mean: I am already aware of it – or again: it is certainly so.» The first of these uses of »I know» occurs when the truth of a statement is not in question, and the speaker tell us that what he has been told is no news to him. The second use is used to emphasize assertions. The importance of the distinction for skepticism is discussed.

43. HERTZBERG, LARS, »En filosof och hans översättare», *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 31 October 1978.

Review of *Filosofiska undersökningar*, Anders Wedberg's Swedish translation of W.'s *Philosophische Untersuchungen*.

44. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Criteria and the Philosophy of Science», in Ilkka Niiniluoto and Raimo Tuomela (eds.), *The Logic and Epistemology of Scientific Change* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979): 31–50.

45. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Totuus ja ymmärtäminen», in Ilkka Niiniluoto and Leila Taiminen (eds.), *Totuus: Suomen filosofisen yhdistyksen järjestämä kotimainen tutkijakollokvio, Helsinki 14.–15. 1. 1980* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Filo-sofian laitos, 1980): 153–163.

Donald Davidson's project in his »Truth and Meaning» (1967) is to find the general form of the propositions of natural language, and as such it has parallels with W.'s proposed definition of this form in *Tractatus* § 4.5. In both Davidson's version and W.'s, the project should be viewed as hopeless, because natural language simply has no uniform nature.

46. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Acting as Representation», in Kjell S. Johannessen and Tore Nordenstam (eds.), *Wittgenstein: Aesthetics and Transcendental Philosophy* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1981): 136–151.

A discussion, in the context of Wittgensteinian aesthetics, of what it means to call an actor's performance convincing.

47. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Science and Certainty», in Ingmar Pörn (ed.), *Essays in Philosophical Analysis: Dedicated to Erik Stenius on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1981): 60–78.

Discusses the treatment of skepticism in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* in the context of the problem of justifying one's trust in scientific methods rather than superstition. It is suggested that taking a skeptical attitude to scientific methods would be nonsensical, because the methods themselves take part in defining scientific concepts.

48. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Critical Notice of Wittgenstein's *Culture and Value*», *Philosophical Investigations* 5 (1982): 154–163.

49. HERTZBERG, LARS, »The Indeterminacy of the Mental», *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 57 (1983): 91–109.

Explores Wittgenstein's suggestion that the uncertainty of judgements about human motives and feelings is intrinsic to them. According to Wittgenstein, the status of many types of mental judgement is logically different from that of judgements about physical and scientific facts. Psychological research cannot be expected to remove the difference, since it is *a priori* in character.

50. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Recension av Svenssons *Doubting the Reality of Reality: Moore and Wittgenstein on Sceptical Doubts*», *Filosofisk tidskrift* 4 (1983), 2: 39–44.

51. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Om erfarenhetens logik: anteckningar kring Wittgensteins *Über Gewissheit*», *Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift* 19 (1984): 193–204.

W.'s *On Certainty* has often been approached as a culmination of his later philosophical enterprise. Taking issue with the work of G. H. von Wright and of Harald Grimen, the author suggests that it could rather be seen as a corrective to some tendencies in the *Philosophical Investigations*, and particularly the tendency to take the builders' language game in the beginning of the book as a kind of paradigm case of language games.

52. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Wittgenstein om estetiska utsagor», *Ajatus* 42 (1985): 106–124.

- 52a. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Wittgenstein on the Nature of Aesthetic Remarks», *Nordisk estetisk tidsskrift* 8 (1992): 45–59.
English version of item 52.

53. HERTZBERG, LARS, »On Language, Interpretation and the Law», in Aleksander Peczenik (ed.), *Meaning, Interpretation and the Law* (Tampere: A-Tieto, 1986): 85–95.

Defends W.'s conception of language against W. V. Quine's in the context of the philosophy of law. One cannot detect vagueness through external observation of linguistic behaviour. In cases where two interpretations seem equally natural, stipulations external to language and arising from human »forms of life» are going to be needed to reach an interpretation of law.

54. HERTZBERG, LARS, »On the Attitude of Trust», *Inquiry* 31 (1988): 307–322.

In *On Certainty*, the emphasis is on the solitary individual as subject of know-ledge. The importance of our dependence on others, however, is brought out in W.'s remarks about trust. In this paper, the role and nature of trust are discussed, the grammar of trust being contrasted with that of reliance. It is shown that to speak of trust is to speak of a fundamental attitude of one person towards others, an attitude which, unlike reliance, is not to be explained, or assessed, by an appeal to reasons. It is, rather, because we have such a fundamental readiness to accept what we are taught by others that we can come to develop an understanding of reasons. The idea that believing something without evidence is always a weakness is shown to be a philosophical prejudice. Trust is always something we can rightfully demand from others: misplaced trust, accordingly, is not a shortcoming on the part of the trustful person, but of the person in whom the trust was placed. The destruction of trust is a tragedy of life; in *Culture and Value*, W. suggests a connection between distrust and madness. [AA]

55. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Review of Winch's *Trying to Make Sense*», *Theoria* 54 (1988): 153–160.

56. HERTZBERG, LARS, »'The Kind of Certainty is the Kind of Language Game'», in D. Z. Phillips and Peter Winch (eds.), *Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars: Essays in Honour of Rush Rhees (1905–1989)* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989): 92–111.

Analyzes the uncertainty of judgements about human beings, especially in relation to the philosophy of mind, in light of W.'s discussion in the *Philosophical Investigations* (especially Part II, Chapter XI).

57. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Om Ludwig Wittgenstein och den judiska bakgrunden», in Karl-Johan Illman (ed.), *Judiska perspektiv* (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, Religions-historiska institutionen, 1989): 179–195.

An examination of the Jewish background to W.'s life and thought, including his family background and his remarks on Jewishness in *Culture and Value*.

58. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Vaikka itse Jumala olisi vilkaissut sieluihimme, hän ei olisi voinut nähdä sieltä, kenestä puhumme'», *Ajatus* 46 (1989): 146–153.

Taking W.'s remarks in the *Philosophical Investigations* as a point of departure, the author discusses the problem of how we can speak of an intention apart from its execution.

59. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Yhteisön tärkeys Wittgensteinin myöhäisajattelussa», *Tiede & edistys* 14 (1989): 219–222.

The so-called »community view» as a condition for linguistic rule-following is false both as a philosophical view and as an interpretation of W. The problem with a solitary speaker of a language is not that he lacks a criterion to differentiate between correct and incorrect usage, but that – being isolated from the social life which gives rise to language – he lacks the need for one.

60. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Wittgenstein – 1900-talets största», *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 26 April 1989.

Review of McGuinness's *Wittgenstein: A Life: Young Ludwig 1889–1921*.

61. HERTZBERG, LARS, »'Diskussionen är min enda medicin'», *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 31 October 1989.

A brief memorial article on Rush Rhees, W.'s student and literary executor.

62. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Wittgenstein and the Sharing of Language», in Rudolf Haller and Johannes Brandl (eds.), *Wittgenstein: Towards a Re-Evaluation*, vol. 2 (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990): 47–56.

A revised and considerably expanded English version of item 59. Although questions of linguistic meaning can be raised only in connection with a community of speakers, it is misleading to say that meaning is determined by community agreement.

63. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Om att urskilja människan i en människa», in Steen Brock and Hans-Jørgen Schanz (eds.), *Imod forstandens forhekselse: en bog om Wittgenstein* (Aarhus: Modtryk, 1990): 63–74.

A discussion of W.'s remarks on the human naturalness of certain expressions and utterances, and of the implication of this for moral life. The difference between the roles the spontaneous and the conventional play in human life is illustrated by reference to Henry James's novel *Portrait of a Lady*.

64. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Primitive Reactions: Logic or Anthropology?», *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 17 (1992): 24–39.

Remarks on W.'s notion of primitive reactions and the question whether philosophy should approach them as a logical or an empirical phenomenon. It is suggested that what can be seen as a primitive reaction in the logical sense depends on the reaction's making sense to us in the context in which it occurs, and thus on its being a reaction we can share in.

65. HERTZBERG, LARS, »'Some Foundational Questions Concerning Language Studies': Commentary», *Journal of Pragmatics* 17 (1992): 461–465.

Reply to Mark H. Bickhard and Robert L. Campbell, »Some Foundational Questions Concerning Language Studies», *Journal of Pragmatics* 17 (1992): 401–433. Bickhard and Campbell are right to emphasize the interactive character of language. As regards the dichotomy between viewing language as a description of reality and viewing it as a form of human communication, they unsatisfactorily remain on the former side, unlike W.

66. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Öppet och dolt hos Wittgenstein», *Finsk tidskrift* 233–234 (1993): 65–67.

Reply to Patrick Sibelius, »Den döende dialogen och filosofins roll däri», *Finsk tidskrift* 231–232 (1992): 521–528. Sibelius's suggestions that W. was hostile towards the idea of dialogue in philosophy, or that he would have liked to end philosophy altogether, are misguided.

67. HERTZBERG, LARS, *The Limits of Experience* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1994).
293 p.; ISBN 951-9264-22-1.

Incorporates material from items 40, 41, 46, 54, 56 and 62.

Reviews:

Eriksson, Stefan, »Hertzberg'ska godbitar», *Finsk tidskrift* 239–240 (1996): 375–379.

Rowe, M. W., *Philosophy* 71 (1996): 304–308.

Sharpe, R. A., *Philosophical Investigations* 19 (1996): 186–190.

68. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Om vidskepelse och religion», *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 30 July 1995.

A brief introduction to D. Z. Phillips and W.ian philosophy of religion.

69. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Förnuftet och religionen», *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 17 August 1995.

Reply to items 37 and 256. Whether Helling likes it or not, a religious reaction to evil such as that described by D. Z. Phillips is perfectly possible as one possibility among others. Stenbäck's attack on W. is briefly dismissed as absurd and irrational.

70. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Review of Johannessen, Larsen and Åmås's *Wittgenstein and Norway*», *Philosophical Investigations* 19 (1996): 193–197.

71. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Pain, Anger and Primitive Reactions», in Kjell S. Johannessen (ed.), *Wittgenstein and Aesthetics: Proceedings From the Skjolden Symposium* (Bergen: Universitetet i Bergen, Filosofisk institutt, 1997): 39–52.
72. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Var Wittgenstein moralfilosof?», *Filosofisk tidskrift* 18 (1997), 1: 3–16.
- 72a. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Was Wittgenstein a Moral Philosopher?», *Studia Theologica* 51 (1997): 144–155.
English version of item 72.

Discusses the question whether W. can be called a moral philosopher considering his suspicious attitude to moral philosophy. The idea of independence from fate in W.'s ethics is singled out for discussion.

73. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Review of Cook's *Wittgenstein's Metaphysics*», *Philosophical Review* 107 (1998): 163–166.
74. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Osakligt och tendentiöst», *Filosofisk tidskrift* 20 (1999), 4: 11–13.

Reply to Sven Danielsson, »Språkfilosofins elände», *Filosofisk tidskrift* 20 (1999), 4: 3–7. The picture Danielsson gives of the reception history of W.'s thought in Sweden, and of Pär Segerdahl's role in it, is biased and tendentious.

75. H[ERTZBERG], L[ARS], »Review of Rhees's *Rush Rhees on Religion and Philo-sophy*», *Ethics* 109 (1999): 703.
76. HERTZBERG, LARS, »On the Difference That Faith Makes», in Tommi Lehtonen and Timo Koistinen (eds.), *Perspectives in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion* (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Society, 2000): 114–135.

- 76a. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Uskonnollisen uskon merkityksestä», in Mirja Aukee-Peiponen and Heikki Kirjavainen (eds.), *Jumala, logiikka ja evidenssi: uskonnonfilosofisia tarkasteluja historiallisten ja modernien aiheiden pohjalta* (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Seura, 2000): 164–184. Finnish translation of item 76 by Mirja Aukee-Peiponen.

A discussion of the human significance of religious belief and how it has been neglected in academic philosophy of religion. Includes a historico-philosophical appendix on W.'s legacy in the philosophy of religion.

77. HERTZBERG, LARS, »The Sense Is Where You Find It», in Timothy McCarthy and Sean C. Stidd (eds.), *Wittgenstein in America* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001): 90–103.

A discussion of W.'s view that it is not up to philosophy to decide under what conditions a sentence of natural language makes sense, with special reference to readings of this view by Cora Diamond and Stanley Cavell.

78. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Rush Rhees on Philosophy and Religious Discourse», *Faith and Philosophy* 18 (2001): 431–442.

Rush Rhees is primarily known as an expounder of W.'s philosophy. However, his depth and originality as a thinker is increasingly recognized, largely due to the posthumous publication of his *Nachlass*. In this essay, characteristic features of Rhees's philosophical style and method are conveyed through comparing and contrasting them with those of W. His most distinctive contributions to philosophy were concerned with language and religion. Rhees's views on the unity of language are compared to those of W., and in conclusion Rhees's thinking about religion is presented through a close reading of one of his essays on that topic. [AA]

79. HERTZBERG, LARS, »Review of Cioffi's *Wittgenstein on Freud and Frazer* and of Clack's *Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion*», *Philosophical Investigations* 24 (2001): 200–207.

80. HERTZBERG, LARS, »On the Need for a Listener and Community Standards»,
in Martin Gustafsson and Lars Hertzberg (eds.), *The Practice of Language*
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002): 247–259.

Discusses communitarian and non-communitarian readings of W.'s private language argument with reference to the case of the solitary speaker. According to W., »the primary relation to be considered is not that between the speaker and the object, but that between speakers and listeners».

81. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Loogisen empirismin kritiikin kritiikkiä», *Suomalainen Suomi* 18 (1950): 545–548.

A critique of the first volume of item 157. Krohn is guilty of many elementary misunderstandings of logical empiricism in general and of the *Tractatus* in particular. He constantly confuses logical questions with material ones, while logical empiricism always seeks to keep them separate. Krohn also gives the misleading impression that W. is still teaching at Cambridge, whereas he actually resigned his chair in 1948.

82. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Tutkimus filosofiasta», *Suomalainen Suomi* 23 (1955): 206–211.

The first part of the only critical notice of W.'s *Philosophical Investigations* to appear in Finnish during the fifties.

83. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Tutkimus kielestä», *Suomalainen Suomi* 23 (1955): 273–277.

The second and last part of item 82.

84. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »On Wittgenstein's 'Solipsism'», *Mind* 64 (1958): 88–91.
- 84a. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »On Wittgenstein's 'Solipsism'», in Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard (eds.), *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: Macmillan, 1966): 157–161.
Reprint of item 84 with a minor addendum.
- 84b. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »On Wittgenstein's 'Solipsism'», in Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard (eds.), *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (New York: Hafner Press, 1973): 157–161.
Reprint of item 84a.
- 84c. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »On Wittgenstein's 'Solipsism'», in Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard (eds.), *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1993): 157–161.
Reprint of item 84a.

The reference to solipsism in the *Tractatus* (§ 5.62) has often been understood in the ordinary meaning of the word, but it actually means the opposite: the limits of a subject's thought and language are the limits of language in general, and there is no private world.

85. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Language-Games for Quantifiers», in Nicholas Rescher (ed.), *Studies in Logical Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968): 46–72.
86. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Quantification and the Picture Theory of Language», *Monist* 53 (1969): 204–230.
- 86a. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Quantification and the Picture Theory of Language», in *Logic, Language-Games and Information: Kantian Themes in the Philosophy of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

Reprint of item 86.

A version of the picture theory of language of the *Tractatus* is extended to all first-order (quantificational) languages, by interpreting Hintikka's model sets as partial pictures (isomorphs) of possible worlds in which their members are true. Each quantificational proof becomes an unsuccessful attempt to depict a world in which the theorem proved would be false.

87. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Wittgenstein on Private Language: Some Sources of Misunderstanding», *Mind* 78 (1969): 423–425.

Discusses *Philosophical Investigations* §§ 245 and 265. The former presents an objection to be disposed of and does not offer a reason for W.'s own position. The operative words of the latter (»Die richtige Erinnerung») can be read, not as referring to the actual correctness of memory, but rather to the right choice among several available memory images.

88. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »'Who is afraid of Ludwig Wittgenstein': A Reply to Professor Fogelin», in Stephan Körner (ed.), *Philosophy of Logic: Papers and Discussions* (Oxford: Blackwell; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976): 231–259.

89. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Language-Games», in Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), *Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G. H. von Wright* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976): 106–125.

- 89a. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Language-Games», *Dialectica* 31 (1977): 225–245.

Reprint of item 89.

- 89b. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Language-Games», in Esa Saarinen (ed.), *Game-Theoretical Semantics: Essays on Semantics by Hintikka, Carlson, Peacocke, Rantala and Saarinen* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979): 1–26.

Reprint of item 89.

- 89c. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Language-Games», in S. G. Shanker (ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, vol. 2 (London: Croom Helm, 1986): 89–105.
Reprint of item 89.

W.'s picture theory of language is similar to Tarskian logical semantics, except for the crucial W.ian doctrine that semantic relations can only be shown, not said. In his later work W. does not reject the semantics of the *Tractatus*, but introduces the theory of language games, which are what creates and sustains the relationship between reality and language.

90. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Wittgenstein's Semantical Kantianism», in Edgar Morscher and Rudolf Stranzinger (eds.), *Ethics: Foundations, Problems and Applications* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1981): 375–390.
91. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »The Objects of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*», in Werner Leinfellner, Eric Kraemer and Jeffrey Schank (eds.), *Language and Ontology* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1982): 429–434.

The »objects» of the *Tractatus* are argued to be sense-data, knowledge of which is similar to the »knowledge by acquaintance» in Russell's epistemology.

92. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Fenomenologi ilman fenomenologiaa: Wittgenstein välittömän kokemuksen filosofina», in Martin Kusch and Jaakko Hintikka, *Kieli ja maailma* (Oulu: Pohjoinen, 1988): 123–142.
Finnish translation by Riitta Korhonen-Kusch of item 92a.
- 92a. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Immediate Experience», in Rudolf Haller and Johannes Brandl (eds.), *Wittgenstein: Towards a Re-Evaluation*, vol. 1 (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990): 155–167.

93. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Onko totuus saavuttamaton?», trans. Riitta Korhonen-Kusch, in Martin Kusch and Jaakko Hintikka, *Kieli ja maailma* (Oulu: Pohjoinen, 1988): 143–169.
94. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »'Die Wende der Philosophie': Wittgenstein's New Logic of 1928», in Ota Weinberger, Peter Koller and Alfred Schramm (eds.), *Philosophy of Law, Politics and Society* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1988): 380–396.
- 94a. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »'Die Wende der Philosophie': Wittgenstein's New Logic of 1928», in Souren Tegrarian (ed.), *Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1994).
Reprint of item 94.

In 1928, W. ceased to believe that truth-function theory is complete. Therefore language-world comparisons could not be immediate, but required human operations on the propositions in question. Initially, this meant that atomic propositions contained numerical parameters and that the operations needed were arithmetical calculations. Hence mathematics was now more fundamental than logic, a view W. also found in Brouwer. Since language belongs to the physical world, those calculations involve temporally persistent physical objects. In October 1929, these ideas led W. to think that language can directly represent only the world of physical objects.

95. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Rules, Games and Experiences: Wittgenstein's Discussion of Rule-Following in the Light of His Development», *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 43 (1989): 279–297.

When W. rejected phenomenological languages in 1929, he could not accommodate rules (especially rules of language) in his new outlook. He had believed that a rule could be gathered from one single experience of using it correctly. This phenomenological conception is what he later criticized in denying that rule-following is a matter of having certain experiences. What at first look like skeptical arguments in W. concerning rule-following are actually a reminder of the conceptual fact that epistemic concepts are not applicable in the primary games of rule-following.

96. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Wittgenstein and the Problem of Phenomenology», in Leila Haaparanta, Martin Kusch and Ilkka Niiniluoto (eds.), *Language, Knowledge and Intentionality: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1990): 15–46.

96a. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Wittgenstein and the Problem of Phenomenology», in Stuart Shanker and David Kilfoyle (eds.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments: Second Series*, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 2002): 235–261.
Reprint of item 96.

In the *Tractatus*, the simple objects referred to by W. are phenomenological. After his return to philosophy in 1929, W. gave up phenomenological objects as references of names, but still maintained a phenomenological ontology. The contrast between physicalistic and phenomenological discourse depends on the principle of identification relied on.

97. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Obstacles to Understanding», *Times Literary Supplement*, 28 September 1990.

Discusses editorial problems with the published scholarly editions of W.'s writings, and the fact that much of his *Nachlass* is still unpublished.

98. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »An Impatient Man and His Papers», *Synthese* 87 (1991): 183–201.

Revised and expanded version of item 97. Because of W.'s impatience as expositor, the problem background of his philosophical ideas is virtually impossible to gather from his so far published writings. So far, attempts to publish a complete edition of the W. papers, which would have remedied this exegetical situation, have been failures.

99. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »The Original *Sinn* of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics», in Klaus Puhl (ed.), *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1993): 24–52.
100. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Ludwig's Apple Tree: On the Philosophical Relations Between Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle», in Friedrich Stadler (ed.), *Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Developments* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993): 27–46.

W. shared many philosophical problems and ideas around 1930 with the Vienna Circle, as can be seen from his 1932 disagreement with Rudolf Carnap over Carnap's alleged plagiarism from W.'s work.

101. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »An Anatomy of Wittgenstein's Picture Theory», in Carol C. Gould and Robert S. Cohen (eds.), *Artifacts, Representations and Social Practice: Essays for Marx Wartofsky* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994): 223–256.

W.'s picture theory of language involves several different assumptions:

(i) Elementary propositions are »pictures«, isomorphic replicas, of the corresponding states of affairs. (ii) The totality of possible combinations of simple objects matches the totality of elementary propositions. (iii) A name shares a logical form with its object. (iv) Elementary propositions are mutually independent. (v) Complex propositions are pictures in the same sense as elementary propositions. (vi) The logical forms of propositions can be represented by their syntactical forms. Later W. rejected (ii), (iv), and (vi), but not the general idea of propositions as pictures.

102. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half Truths* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996).
xiv, 353 p.; ISBN 0-7923-4091-4.

Incorporates material from items 88, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 110, 111, 112, 117 and 119.

Reviews:

Agassi, Joseph, »To Close the Wittgenstein Project«, *Iyyun* 49 (2000): 313–329.

Cometti, Jean-Pierre, *Revue internationale de philosophie* 51 (1997): 583–587.

103. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Wittgenstein on Being and Time«, *Theoria* 62 (1996): 3–18.

W.'s evolving conception of time is traced chronologically through his writings, and its importance in his philosophy of language and his ontology is assessed. A distinction is made between »memory time«, which is essentially solipsistic and can only distinguish earlier from later, and »information time«, which is defined by physical measurement. In the *Tractatus*, W. held memory time to be primary, but changed his mind later in favour of information time as he adopted a physicalistic conception of language.

104. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Ovatko uutiset analyttisen filosofian kuolemasta liioiteltuja?», in I. A. Kieseppä, Sami Pihlström and Panu Raatikainen (eds.), *Tieto, totuus ja todellisuus: kirjoituksia Ilkka Niiniluodon 50-vuotispäivän kunniaksi* ([Helsinki]: Gaudeamus, 1996): 267–280.

Finnish translation by Risto Vilkkö of item 104a.

104a. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Who Is About to Kill Analytic Philosophy?», in Anat Biletzki and Anat Matar (eds.), *The Story of Analytic Philosophy: Plot and Heroes* (London: Routledge, 1998): 253–269.

104b. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Ovatko uutiset analyttisen filosofian kuolemasta liioiteltuja?», in Jaakko Hintikka, *Filosofian köyhyys ja rikkaus: nykyfilosofian kartoitusta* (Helsinki: Art House, 2001): 21–39.

Reprint of item 104.

Owing to recent theoretical developments that have proved to be fruitful, it cannot be said that W. has brought about the end of the project of analytic philosophy, even if he himself would have liked to do so.

105. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »The Idea of Phenomenology in Wittgenstein and Husserl», in Keith Lehrer and Johann Christian Marek (eds.), *Austrian Philosophy Past and Present: Essays in Honor of Rudolf Haller* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997): 101–123.

105a. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »The Idea of Phenomenology in Wittgenstein and Husserl», in Friedrich Stadler (ed.), *Phänomenologie und logischer Empirismus: Zentenarium Felix Kaufmann (1895–1949)* (Wien: Springer, 1997): 127–152.

Reprint of item 105.

105b. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »L'idée de phénoménologie chez Wittgenstein», in Élisabeth Rigal (ed.), *Jaakko Hintikka: questions de logique et de phénoménologie* (Paris: Vrin, 1998): 199–222.

French translation by Élisabeth Rigal of item 105.

106. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Comment on Nils-Eric Sahlin», in Matti Sintonen (ed.), *Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on Jaakko Hintikka's Epistemology and Philosophy of Science* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997): 315–317.

Reply to Nils-Eric Sahlin, »'He is no good for my work': On the Philosophical Relations Between Ramsey and Wittgenstein», in the same volume.

107. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Réponses et commentaires», trans. Élisabeth Rigal, in Élisabeth Rigal (ed.), *Jaakko Hintikka: questions de logique et de phénoménologie* (Paris: Vrin, 1998): 309–329.

Reply to David Pears, »Le Wittgenstein de Hintikka», and Mathieu Marion, »Wittgenstein en transition: du langage phénoménologique au langage physicaliste», both in the same volume.

108. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, *On Wittgenstein* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2000). 65 p.; ISBN 0-534-57594-3.

A short introductory book following the interpretation of W. set out in Hintikka's other work on him.

109. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, »Mitä tieteenfilosofiassa todella tapahtuu?», *Tieteessä tapahtuu* 19 (2001), 7: 42–45.

Reply to Pihlström's review of Hintikka's *Filosofian köyhyys ja rikkaus*, accusing Pihlström of neglecting Hintikka's arguments in favour of his interpretation of W.'s thought.

110. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., »Different Language-Games in Wittgenstein», in Rudolf Haller and Wolfgang Grassl (eds.), *Language, Logic and Philosophy* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1980): 417–422.

111. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., »Wittgenstein: Some Perspectives on the Development of His Thought», in Ingmar Pörn (ed.), *Essays in Philosophical Analysis: Dedicated to Erik Stenius on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1981): 79–95.

Ostensive definition plays an important role in W.'s middle period, being a descendant of the idea of showing in the *Tractatus*. But the allegedly direct naming relations which ostensive definitions can establish were in W.'s later philosophy constituted by language games, which can be learned only by training and not by ostension. This led W. to de-emphasize rules and criteria in his later philosophy.

112. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., »Wittgenstein and the 'Universal Language' of Painting», in Edgar Morscher and Rudolf Stranzinger (eds.), *Ethics: Foundations, Problems and Applications* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Temps-ky, 1981): 492–497.
113. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., »Some Remarks on (Wittgensteinian) Logical Form», *Synthese* 56 (1983): 155–170.
114. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., »The Development of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy: The Hidden Unity», in Paul Weingartner and Hans Czermak (eds.), *Epistemology and Philosophy of Science* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1983): 425–437.
115. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., »Wittgensteinin *Tractatus*-teoksen salaisuus», in Lauri A. Vuorela (ed.), *Suomalainen tiedeakatemia: Vuosikirja 1982–1983* (Helsinki: Suomalainen tiedeakatemia, 1983): 121–133.
- 115a. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., »Wittgensteinin *Tractatus*-teoksen salaisuus», in Jaakko Hintikka, *Filosofian köyhyys ja rikkaus: nykyfilosofian kartoitusta* (Helsinki: Art House, 2001): 297–317.
Reprint of item 115.

The primary language of the *Tractatus* is a phenomenological language, and the objects discussed in the work are phenomenal. This also throws light on W.'s early views on ethics and aesthetics, which are argued to be similar to those of the Bloomsbury group and especially of G. E. Moore.

116. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., »Wittgenstein über private Erfahrung», in Dieter Birnbacher and Armin Burkhardt (eds.), *Sprachspiel und Methode: Zum Stand der Wittgenstein-Diskussion* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985): 1–26.

117. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., »Ludwig Looks at the Necker Cube: The Problem of 'Seeing As' as a Clue to Wittgenstein's Philosophy», in Ghita Holmström and Andrew J. I. Jones (eds.), *Action, Logic and Social Theory: Dedicated to Ingmar Pörn on the Occasion of His 50th Birthday* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1985): 36–48.

W.'s various comments on ambiguous figures such as the Necker cube lend support to the Hintikkas' interpretation of W. as abandoning his earlier pheno-menological view of language for a physicalist language in 1929.

118. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., *Investigating Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

xx, 326 p.; ISBN 0-631-14179-0.

118a. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., *Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990).

418 p.; ISBN 3-518-57980-0. German translation of item 118 by Joachim Schulte.

118b. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., *Indagine su Wittgenstein* (Bolog-na: Il Mulino, 1990).

435 p.; ISBN 88-15-02468-9. Italian translation of item 118 by Mario Alai.

- 118c. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., *Investigations sur Wittgenstein* (Liège: Mardaga, 1991).
359 p.; ISBN 2-87009-433-7. French translation of item 118 by Martine Jawerbaum and Yaron Pesztat.
- 118d. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., *Uma investigação sobre Wittgenstein* (São Paulo: Papirus, 1994).
399 p.; ISBN 85-308-0314-0. Portuguese translation of item 118 by Enid Abreu Donbranszky.

An interpretation of W.'s philosophical life work in which the *Tractatus* is seen as a treatise on phenomenological language inspired by the epistemology defended by Russell in his writings around 1913–1914, and W.'s later work from 1929 onwards is seen as the abandonment of the *Tractatus* view in favour of a physicalistic language and the theory of language games as guarantors of a relationship between language and reality. W.'s philosophy is seen as weakened by his life-long commitment to the ineffability of semantics.

Reviews:

- Ambrose, Alice, *International Studies in Philosophy* 19 (1987), 3: 87–89.
- Bradley, Raymond and Resnick, Lawrence, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 20 (1990): 449–466.
- Budd, Malcolm, »Unravelling the Thread«, *Times Literary Supplement*, 13 March 1987.
- Carruthers, Peter, *Philosophical Quarterly* 38 (1988): 244–249.
- Denning, La Verne J., *Canadian Philosophical Reviews* 7 (1987): 350–352.
- Engel, Pascal, *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger* 112 (1987): 530.
- Fogelin, Robert J., *Philosophical Review* 98 (1989): 93–97.
- Gomm, R. M., *Philosophical Investigations* 11 (1988): 162–166.
- Haaparanta, Leila, »Wittgenstein ja filosofian suuri linja«, *Helsingin Sanomat*, 22 January 1987.
- Hanfling, Oswald, *Philosophy* 62 (1987): 529–533.
- Largeault, Jean, *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger* 117 (1992): 350.
- Mies, Jürgen, *Erkenntnis* 33 (1990): 264–267.

Moulder, James, *South African Journal of Philosophy* 7 (1988): 186–187.

Tomasini, Alejandro, *Crítica* 55 (1987): 117–124.

Zemach, Eddy M., *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 49 (1988): 171–177.

119. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., »Wittgenstein's *annus mirabilis*: 1929», in Werner Leinfellner and Franz M. Wuketits (eds.), *The Tasks of Contemporary Philosophy* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1986): 437–447.

W.'s notebooks show that on 22 October 1929, he rejected phenomenological languages for physicalistic ones. This presented him immediately with new philo-sophical problems, some of which he tried to solve with the so-called »private language argument» and with his concept of the language game.

120. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., »Wittgenstein and Language as the Universal Medium», in Jaakko Hintikka, *Lingua Universalis vs. Calculus Ratiocinator: An Ultimate Presupposition of Twentieth-Century Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997): 162–190.
Reprint of an extract from item 118.

121. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and PARK, BYONG-CHUL, »The Background of Wittgenstein's Phenomenology», *Phenomenological Inquiry* 19 (1995): 134–148.

The authors examine the historical background of W.'s use of the term »phenomenology» to characterize his philosophy, pointing primarily to the influence of Ernst Mach and Ludwig Boltzmann.

122. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and PROVENCE, MERRILL B., »Wittgenstein on Privacy and Publicity», in Elisabeth Leinfellner et al. (eds.), *Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1978): 353–362.

- 122a. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO and HINTIKKA, MERRILL B., »Uusi näkökulma Wittgensteinin myöhäisfilosofiaan», in Jaakko Hintikka, *Kieli ja mieli: katsauksia kielifilosofiaan ja merkityksen teoriaan* (Helsinki: Otava, 1982): 184–197.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of item 122.

123. HODGES, ANDREW, *Alan Turing, arvoitus* (Helsinki: Terra Cognita, 2000).

604 p., [8] p. of plates: illus.; ISBN 952-5202-14-3.

Finnish translation by Kimmo Pietiläinen of *Alan Turing: The Enigma* (1983). Contains extensive discussions of Turing's intellectual relationship to W. and his attendance of W.'s 1939 lectures.

124. HODGES, ANDREW, *Turing: luonnonfilosofi* (Helsinki: Otava, 2000).

79 p.; ISBN 951-1-16173-3.

Finnish translation by Floora Ruokonen and Risto Vilkkö of *Turing: A Natural Philosopher* (1997). Contains part of the discussion in item 123.

125. HYVÖNEN, TAPIO, *Fysiikan tietoteoreettiset perusteet fenomenologian ja kielipe-
lien näkökulmasta* (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Department of Physics, 1995).

144 p.; illus.; ISBN 951-45-7177-0.

In this study the character of the perception and measurement in physics is discussed in relation to W.'s idea of language game; Husserl's intentional acts and noemas; Reenpää's response-stimulus schema; and Putnam's metaphysical and inner realism. In Chapter One the understanding of the connection between language and the world included in W.'s *Tractatus* is analyzed, followed by a discussion of how the relation in question is seen in W.'s idea of language game. Next, Husserl's comprehension of intentionality is presented. The central idea of this is to show how Husserl understands perception, and his concept of noema. At the end of Chapter One the relation between noema and language game is discussed. It is suggested and argued that it is possible to consider noema as a »formation» in which language games and the rules included in them are effected. [AA]

126. ITKONEN, ESA, *Linguistics and Metascience* ([Turku]: Societas Philosophica et Phænomenologica Finlandiæ, 1974).
363 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-99029-4-5.

A defence of general linguistics as a humanistic science in which hermeneutical methods are acceptable, with many references to W. and his philosophical tradition.

127. ITKONEN, ESA, *Linguistics and Empiricalness: Answers to Criticisms* (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Department of General Linguistics, 1976).
67 p.; ISBN 951-45-0890-4.

Answers to various criticisms directed against item 126.

128. ITKONEN, ESA, *Grammatical Theory and Metascience: A Critical Investigation into the Philosophical and Methodological Foundations of »Autonomous» Linguistics* (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1978).
x, 355 p.; ISBN 90-272-0901-4.

Revised version of items 126 and 127.

129. ITKONEN, ESA, *Causality in Linguistic Theory: A Critical Investigation into the Philosophical and Methodological Foundations of »Non-Autonomous» Linguistics* (London: Croom Helm; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983).
x, 332 p.: illus.; ISBN 0-7099-1313-3 (Croom Helm); 0-253-31325-2 (Indiana University Press).

A companion volume to item 128, arguing very much on the same lines.

130. ITKONEN, ESA, »Kielentutkimusta logiikan ja filosofian näkökulmasta», *Virittäjä* 87 (1983): 403–415.
- 130a. ITKONEN, ESA, »Jaakko Hintikan kieliteoriaa», in *Kielitieteen kääntöpuoli* (Turku: Turun yliopisto, Yleisen kielitieteen laitos, 1999): 95–113.
Reprint of item 130.

A critique of the book containing item 122a. Jaakko Hintikka claims that his interpretation of language games as a bridge between language and reality is new and revolutionary, and so is his view of the *Philosophical Investigations* as supplementing the *Tractatus*. However, E. K. Specht and Anthony Kenny defended these views with more subtlety long ago.

131. ITKONEN, ESA, »Concerning the Ontological Question in Linguistics», *Language & Communication* 4 (1984): 241–246.

Reply to Trevor Pateman, »What Is a Language?», *Language & Communication* 3 (1983): 101–127. The author examines critically Pateman's proposed counterexamples to W.'s private language argument. Since Pateman wishes to undermine W.'s argument by examples taken from outside the synchronic-grammatical study of natural languages, he tacitly admits that the argument applies to this kind of study.

132. ITKONEN, ESA, »Kielitieteen filosofian 'ikuisuuskyseymys': havaintoja vuoden 1976 jälkeisestä keskustelusta», in Esa Itkonen, Anneli Pajunen and Timo Haukioja (eds.), *Kielitieteen kentän kartoitusta* (Turku: Turun yliopisto, Suomalaisen ja yleisen kielitieteen laitos, 1992): 51–72.

132a. ITKONEN, ESA, »Kielitieteen filosofian 'ikuisuuskyseymys': havaintoja vuoden 1976 jälkeisestä keskustelusta», in *Kirjoituksia kielitieteestä, filosofiasta, historiasta ja politiikasta* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, 1998): 65–85.

Reprint of item 132.

Gordon Baker and P. M. S. Hacker are correct in their W.ian criticisms of Platonist and psychologist linguistics, but are excessively suspicious of linguistics and cognitive science in general. W.'s »private language argument» demonstrates the unviability of Chomsky's views on natural languages.

133. JORMAKKA, KARI, »Arkkitehtuuri ja filosofia: yleisiä huomautuksia Wittgensteinin talosta», *Arkkitehti* 82 (1985), 5: 79–83.

It is suggested that the house W. designed for his sister Margaret is an example of the kind of essentialist, loosely Aristotelian ideology that dominated architectural thinking in the beginning of the twentieth century. This interpretation of the house is illustrated by a commentary on various remarks from *Culture and Value*.

134. JUTI, RIKU, »Uskomisen kaksi kielipeliä Wittgensteinin 'pelkistetyssä filoso-fiassa'», in Sami Pihlström, Martti Kuokkanen and Gabriel Sandu (eds.), *Filo-sofisia tienviittoja Heikki Kanniston 50-vuotispäivän kunniaksi* (Helsinki: Hel-singin yliopisto, Filosofian laitos, 1995): 141–146.

The language game of recognizing the feeling of certainty in ourselves, and generalizing it to a part of the reality of other human beings, is completely different from the language game of taking the behaviour of others to imply that they experience certain feelings. In fact, it is doubtful whether the former can be called a language game at all.

135. JÄRVELÄINEN, PETRI, »Colours of Thought: Wittgenstein on Emotions and Their Dependence on Culture», in Kjell S. Johannessen and Tore Nordenstam (eds.), *Culture and Value: Philosophy and the Cultural Sciences* (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 1995): 34–39.

136. KAILA, EINO, *Probleme der Deduktion* (Turku: Turun yliopisto, 1928).
86 p.

The first Finnish publication to mention W., crediting *Tractatus* § 6.1 on its first page.

137. KAILA, EINO, *Der logistische Neupositivismus: eine kritische Studie* (Turku: Turun yliopisto, 1930).
93 p.

- 137a. KAILA, EINO, »Logistic Neopositivism: A Critical Study», in *Reality and Experience: Four Philosophical Essays* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979): 1–58.

English translation of item 137 by Ann and Peter Kirschenmann.

The second Finnish publication to mention W., this is an introductory work on the Vienna Circle and logical empiricism.

138. KANGASNIEMI, HEIKKI, »Missä tieto loppuu? eli Wittgensteinin ja Joukahaisen kilpalaulanta», in Merja Karjalainen (ed.), *Kielitieteellisiä muistoonpanoja 1* (Oulu: Oulun yliopisto, Suomen ja saamen kielen laitos, 1986): 104–118.

An account of W.'s view in *On Certainty* that Moore's common-sense claims are non-informative and therefore not knowledge. A playful comparison with the *Kalevala* is drawn in the conclusion.

139. KANGASNIEMI, HEIKKI, »Ludwig Wittgensteinin kieliopilliset tutkimukset», in Harri Mantila (ed.), *Kielitieteellisiä muistoonpanoja 3* (Oulu: Oulun yliopisto, Suomen ja saamen kielen laitos, 1990): 39–50.

A discussion of W.'s grammatical investigations of psychological and intentional verbs, demonstrative pronouns, colour words and the notion of knowledge. The distinction between surface grammar and depth grammar is emphasized.

140. KANNISTO, HEIKKI, *Esteettisen arvoarvostelman luonteesta: Ludwig Wittgensteinin estetiikasta* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Yleisen kirjallisuustieteen ja teatterintutkimuksen laitos, 1977). 89 p.; ISBN 951-45-1031-3.

A study of W.'s aesthetics in light of his »Lectures on Aesthetics» and other related remarks. W.'s aesthetics is a consistent part of his more general philosophical thinking, especially his emphasis on socially shared rules and his early view that values are transcendental. Claims by Harold Osborne and other aestheticians to the effect that W. had only a primitive aesthetic sensibility, or none at all, are unfounded.

141. KANNISTO, HEIKKI, *Thoughts and Their Subject: A Study of Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1986). 184 p.; ISBN 951-95055-5-5.

A study of the *Tractatus* presenting the early W. not as a logician, but »as more a metaphysician and an epistemologist, or even a fantast of a sort», discussing the nature of the metaphysical subject in the *Tractatus*, and suggesting that the book should be approached as a strongly Kantian work.

Reviews:

Emiliani, Alberto, *Lingua e stile* 22 (1987): 557–560.

Maury, André, *Ajatus* 44 (1987): 186–191.

142. KANNISTO, HEIKKI, »Ymmärtäminen, kritiikki ja hermeneutiikka», in Ilkka Niiniluoto and Esa Saarinen (eds.), *Vuosisatamme filosofia* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1986): 145–243.

- 142a. Kannisto, Heikki, »Ymmärtäminen, kritiikki ja hermeneutiikka», in Ilkka Niiniluoto and Esa Saarinen (eds.), *Nykyajan filosofia* (Helsinki: WSOY, 2002): 303–435.

Reprint of item 142.

An introduction to the hermeneutic tradition in the philosophy of the human sciences, with special reference to both W.'s own writings and to the attempts by Peter Winch to develop his thought further.

143. KANNISTO, HEIKKI, »Miksi Wittgenstein (lähes) vaikenä etiikasta?», *Tiede & edistys* 14 (1989): 213–218.

A discussion of the reasons and causes of W.'s unwillingness to discuss ethics in his work in spite of the great importance he attached to moral questions.

144. KANNISTO, HEIKKI, »Wittgensteinin *Tractatus* – kantilainen traktaatti?», *Königsberg* 1 (1996), 1: 42–51.

The *Tractatus* can most fruitfully be approached as a Kantian treatise in which W. seeks to extend Kant's analysis of the transcendental conditions of know-ledge into the realm of language. W.'s version of Kant's transcendental deduction involves the mental act of projecting propositions to reality.

145. KARE, KAUKO, »Sana ja ajatus», *Suomalainen Suomi* 18 (1950): 530–536.

Reply to item 148. The author attacks logical empiricism in a vituperative manner as philistine and hostile towards humanistic understanding. He ridicules W.'s *Tractatus* definition of philosophy as an activity in light of its purported followers' complete devotion to formalisms and theories.

146. KARE, KAUKO, »Sana ja ajatus», *Suomalainen Suomi* 19 (1951): 37–38.

Reply to item 309. It is argued that Valpola's criticisms of Kare and his attempted vindication of logical empiricism rest on crude and malicious distortions.

147. KARLSSON, SVANTE, »'Huvudsaken är att folk har arbete'», *Nya Argus* 88 (1995): 180–182, 190.

An essay discussing the motivational and cultural background of W.'s 1935 visit to the Soviet Union and his plans to settle there.

148. KETONEN, OIVA, »Metafysiikasta ja loogisesta empirismistä», *Suomalainen Suomi* 18 (1950): 464–469.

Reply to item 160. Krohn ignores the background of logical empiricism as an expression of a certain philosophical temperament not limited to it. Attacks on specific linguistic formulations of empiricism, such as those made by Joad, are bound to miss their target. Krohn also sets up a false dichotomy in insisting that philosophers must choose between practicing logical empiricism and doing traditional metaphysics.

149. KIRJAVAINEN, HEIKKI, *Usko, tieto ja kieli: eräitä ongelmanasetteluja ja niitä valaisevaa kirjallisuutta uudessa anglosaksisessa uskonnonfilosofisessa keskustelussa vuosina 1955–1974* ([Helsinki]: Gaudeamus, 1974).
120 p.; ISBN 951-662-131-7.

Includes extensive discussions of W.'s influence on the philosophy of religion, and of thinkers influenced by him, such as D. Z. Phillips, Peter Winch and Norman Malcolm. – Reprinted 1975 (with corrections).

150. KIRJAVAINEN, HEIKKI, »The Possibility of a Semantics for Religious Language», in Vincent Brümmer (ed.), *Proceedings: Seventh European Conference on Philosophy of Religion: Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Language and Their Relevance for the Study of Religious Discourse* (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 1988): 11–32.
151. KIVINEN, S. ALBERT, »'... opineerata nukkuvansa': Norman Malcolmin *Dreaming*-teoksen tarkastelua», *Camenes* 9 (1988).
- 151a. KIVINEN, S. ALBERT, »'... opineerata nukkuvansa': Norman Malcolmin *Dreaming*-teoksen tarkastelua», in *Merkilliset kirjoitukset: novelleja, artikkeleita, filo-sofiaa* ([Tampere]: Pirkanmaan Kirjapaino ja Lehtikustannus, 1990): 234–258.

Norman Malcolm's W.ian arguments that dreaming is not an experience or a series of experiences are not impressive. Especially unconvincing is Malcolm's view that one cannot opine that one is dreaming.

152. KNUUTTILA, SIMO, »Bilberg, Wittgenstein ja fideistinen virhepäätelmä», in Eeva Martikainen (ed.), *Teologia tieteen murroksissa: Suomalaisen teologisen kirjallisuusseuran vuosikirja 1986* (Helsinki: Suomalainen teologinen kirjallisuusseura, 1986): 79–92.

Some of W.'s views on religious language mirror those of Johan Bilberg, a Swedish seventeenth-century theologian. Both W. and Bilberg hold views about the relevance of evidence for religious language games which are problematic in not explaining how they propose to avoid fideism.

153. KOIRANEN, SIRPA, »Thoughts on LSP as Language Games», *Special Language* 11 (1989): 42–48.

W.'s notion of language games would be well suited for research on language for specific purposes (LSP) oriented towards practical applications. Many languages exist for specific purposes and are related to other forms of language use, and it is possible that LSP's differences from ordinary language could be explained through the concept of language games.

154. KOISTINEN, TIMO, »Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Religion: Clarification of Religious Language and Practice», in *Philosophy of Religion Or Religious Philosophy? A Critical Study of Contemporary Anglo-American Approaches* (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Society, 2000): 139–160.

An elementary exposition of W.ian philosophy of religion, as exemplified mainly by the work of D. Z. Phillips.

155. KORHONEN, ANSSI, »The Limits of Significance», in Sami Pihlström, Martti Kuokkanen and Gabriel Sandu (eds.), *Filosofisia tienviittoja Heikki Kanniston 50-vuotispäivän kunniaksi* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Filosofian laitos, 1995): 147–153.

The *Tractatus* is commonly viewed as defending a Kantian, transcendental view of the nature of logic. The author draws attention to the fact that many elements of this view are already present in writings of Russell dating from the years before W. began work on the *Tractatus*.

156. KORPELA, JUKKA, *A Formalization of Wittgenstein's Definition of Natural Numbers* (Espoo: Helsinki University of Technology, Computing Centre, 1977).
18 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-751-000-4.

W.'s definition of natural numbers as »exponents of operations» is investigated and formalized. Different systems of »numbers» are obtained; their structure depends on how large the underlying set of objects of operations is considered to be. Metamathematical questions related to the definition of the natural number system are discussed. The investigation, although quite simple technically, gives a formalism which is intuitively more enlightening than the traditional one. [AA]

157. KROHN, SVEN, *Der logische Empirismus: eine kritische Untersuchung* (Turku: Turun yliopisto, 1949–1950).
2 vols (276, 307 p.).

A highly critical examination – from a neo-Platonist viewpoint – of the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle. Many references, especially in the first volume, to the *Tractatus*, which is interpreted as an apotheosis of positivism.

158. KROHN, SVEN, »Loogisen empirismin verbalistinen vaihe», *Valvoja* 69 (1949): 192–199.

The recent attempts to modify the initially strong verification thesis of logical empiricism so that it would include science, but exclude metaphysics and ethics, have ended in disaster. The aim of Carnap and others to develop special metalanguages, which would be helpful in this task, have merely overemphasized the role of linguistic investigations in philosophy at the expense of investigations into reality.

159. KROHN, SVEN, »Monaadit ja 'kielet'», *Valvoja* 70 (1950): 115–121.

W.'s logical atomism in the *Tractatus* mirrors Leibniz's doctrine of windowless monads, especially as regards the later physicalistic version of W.'s doctrine developed by Carnap. It completely fails to explain or accommodate the irreducibly intersubjective nature of language.

160. KROHN, SVEN, »C. E. M. Joad ja looginen empirismi», *Suomalainen Suomi* 18 (1950): 408–414.

A discussion of C. E. M. Joad's book *A Critique of Logical Positivism* (1950). Joad is correct to describe logical empiricism as a combination of hubristic worship of science, moral nihilism and extreme scepticism.

161. KROHN, SVEN, »Loogisesta empirismistä: vastaus arvosteluun», *Suomalainen Suomi* 18 (1950): 548–552.

Reply to item 81. *Pace* Hintikka, Krohn's dissertation does not downplay the conceptual nature attributed to philosophy by W. and the logical empiricists. Hintikka's attempt to defend the system of the *Tractatus* by regretting the absence of metalanguages in it is a failure, as metalanguages are an evasive attempt to dispose of genuine philosophical difficulties.

162. KURTÉN, TAGE, »Nyky aikaan suuntautunut teologia ja tiede», in Eeva Martikainen (ed.), *Teologia tieteen murroksissa: Suomalaisen teologisen kirjallisuusseuran vuosikirja 1986* (Helsinki: Suomalainen teologinen kirjallisuusseura, 1986): 133–148.

Building on item 296, the author suggests that religious language gets its meaning from religious practices and can be considered as the object of theology. Constructive theology seeks to arbitrate between religious and non-religious languages when one of these tries to occupy a certain social context to the exclusion of the other.

163. KURTÉN, TAGE, *Grunder för en kontextuell teologi: ett wittgensteinskt sätt att närma sig teologin i diskussion med Anders Jeffner* (Åbo: Åbo akademiska förlag, 1987). 224 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-9498-15-X.

The author formulates and defends a W.ian approach to theology inspired by the writings of Norman Malcolm, Peter Winch and D. Z. Phillips. There are two main traditions in the philosophy of religion: one deals with the question of the meaning of religious language, while the other is interested in the question of the truth of such language. W. and his followers represent the former tradition, while the latter one is exemplified by the Swedish theologian Anders Jeffner. The W.ian approach is shown to be more successful than Jeffner's approach in doing justice to the nature of religious tradition and the rootedness of religious practices in human societies.

Review:

Wahlström, Bertel, *Temenos* 24 (1988): 170–172.

164. KURTÉN, TAGE, »Glebe-Møller, Wittgenstein och 'Helligånden'», *Dansk teo-logisk tidsskrift* 57 (1997): 116–132.

Examines the recent work of the Danish philosopher and theologian Jens Glebe-Møller, whose thinking is seen to have undergone a shift from an Enlightenment-inspired («modern») to a more W.-inspired («postmodern») way of dealing with the fundamental questions of theology. Glebe-Møller is seen to interpret W. in a fashion that makes W. too congenial to the tradition of the Enlightenment. He is liable to view W.'s philosophical remarks on religion as a theory, which they are not. He thereby misses possibilities inherent in W.ian philosophy which could provide arguments for a scientific, contextual theology. [Modified AA]

165. KUUSELA, OSKARI, »Wittgensteinin kieliopillinen filosofia», *niin & näin* 5 (1998), 3: 18–25.

According to the later W., philosophical problems are essentially problems about the use of language. He calls his philosophical viewpoint a grammatical one. It is not a substantive philosophical doctrine, but a method – a way of approaching philosophical questions and problems. W.'s philosophical viewpoint and his conception of language are deeply intertwined.

166. KUUSELA, OSKARI, »Wittgenstein and Metaphysics: From General Metaphysical Theses to Comparisons», in Uwe Meixner and Peter Simons (eds.), *Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age*, vol. 1 (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 1999): 344–349.

The author aims to sketch an interpretation of the relation of W.'s later philosophy to metaphysical philosophy, exemplified by his *Tractatus*. He attempts to show, through a discussion of what W. says is problematic in the *Tractatus*' approach to philosophy and of W.'s later understanding of a philosophical use of language as presenting comparisons, how W.'s later philosophy can be understood to break away from metaphysical philosophy. [AA]

167. KUUSELA, OSKARI, »Universaalikielen idea ja Wittgenstein», in Panu Raatikainen (ed.), *Universaalikieli: Suomen filosofisen yhdistyksen ja Helsingin yliopiston filosofian laitoksen järjestämä kollokvio 16. 4. 1999* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Filosofian laitos, 2000): 129–145.

An examination of W.'s relation to Leibniz's dream of a *characteristica universalis*. The *Tractatus* can be seen as one attempt at constructing a universal language, while W.'s later work renders problematic the very idea of such a language. This has to do with W.'s doubts about whether it makes sense to say that the analysis of a given linguistic expression is ever complete.

168. KUUSELA, OSKARI, »Wittgenstein ja transsendentaalifilosofia», *niin & näin* 8 (2001), 1: 53–65.

Reply to item 214. W.'s philosophical aims are essentially contrary to those of transcendental philosophy, and only a straw-man version of him can be attached to the transcendentalist tradition.

169. KUUSELA, OSKARI, »Wittgenstein's Way Out of Kantian Philosophy», in Rudolf Haller and Klaus Puhl (eds.), *Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy*, vol. 1 (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2001): 435–439.

Associating W.'s philosophy with the Kantian project of critical philosophy is problematic. W. does not aim to give philosophical foundations to language, but to show that the idea of such foundations is incoherent.

170. KUUSELA, OSKARI, »Wittgenstein filosofiasta ja filosofisesta tiedosta», in Petri Räsänen and Marika Tuohimaa (eds.), *Näkökulmia filosofiseen tietoon* (Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto, 2002).

171. KUUSELA, OSKARI; LAHTINEN, MIKKO; and PIHLSTRÖM, SAMI, »Akateemikko Georg Henrik von Wrightin haastattelu: Filosofiassa Russell on voittanut Wittgensteinin», *niin & näin* 5 (1998), 3: 6–12.

An interview with G. H. von Wright discussing his personal relationship to W.; W.'s waning influence on contemporary thought; the scientific spirit of recent analytic philosophy; W.'s Spenglerian views on ethics and politics; the impossibility of applied ethics; W.'s *Nachlass* and its scholarly significance; and W. as deconstructing the tradition of Western philosophy.

172. LAGERSPETZ, OLLI, »Strömlinjeformat om Wittgenstein och tro», *Filosofisk tidskrift* 20 (1999), 2: 51–58.

Review of Eriksson's *Ett mönster i livets väv: tro och religion i ljuset av Wittgensteins filosofi*.

173. LAGERSPETZ, OLLI, »Review of Pleasants's *Wittgenstein and the Idea of a Critical Social Theory*», *Philosophical Investigations* 24 (2001): 207–211.

174. LAURÉN, CHRISTER, »Från vagga till grav: om byråkratspråk», *Finsk tidskrift* 225–226 (1989): 432–436.

An essay on the language of bureaucrats and other authorities, drawing comparisons with W.'s simile comparing language to an ancient city.

175. LEHTONEN, HEIKKI, »Neron velvollisuus», *Sosiologia* 30 (1993): 242–243.

Review of Monk's *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*.

176. LINDFORS, PERTTI, »An Evaluation of the Finnish Contribution to Wittgenstein Studies», in Rudolf Haller and Johannes Brandl (eds.), *Wittgenstein: Towards a Re-Evaluation*, vol. 3 (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990): 291–293.

Brief remarks on Jaakko Hintikka's criticisms of the standard interpretation of W.'s later philosophy; G. H. von Wright's comparison of *On Certainty* to Kuhn's philosophy of science; and what the author sees as W.'s bearing on the thought of several other Finnish philosophers.

177. MALCOLM, NORMAN, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: muistelma* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1990).
249 p.; ISBN 951-0-16162-4.

Finnish translation by Pentti Polameri of *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, second ed. (1984). – Reprinted 1999.

Reviews:

Ahonen, Erik, »Wittgensteinin karun elämän äärellä», *Aamulehti*, 28 April 1990.

Kanerva, Jukka, »Filosofin muotokuva», *Keskisuomalainen*, 28 April 1990.

Kannisto, Heikki, »Joka ei valehtele, on jo riittävän omaperäinen», *Uusi Suomi*, 28 April 1990.

Lehtola, Jyrki, »Pyhä pää ilman ruumista», *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, 29 April 1990.

Lybeck, Jari, »Johdatus neron sielunmaisemaan», *Turun Sanomat*, 7 July 1990.

Räty, Arvi, »Filosofi joka piti dekkareista», *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, 12 June 1990.

Siltala, Raimo, »Luonnos erakkofilosofin elämäkerraksi», *Helsingin Sanomat*, 28 April 1990.

Suokas, Risto-Juhani, »Lyhyt johdatus kielipeleihin», *Kansan Uutiset*, 1 August 1990.

Virtanen, Arto, »Mittasuhteiden ankara täsmällisyys», *Kaleva*, 30 July 1990.

178. MANDELBAUM, MAURICE, »Perheyhtäläisyydet ja taidetta koskevat yleistyksset», in Markus Lammenranta and Arto Haapala (eds.), *Taide ja filosofia* (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 1987): 85–102.

Translation by Kimmo Korhonen of »Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the Arts» (1965). The use of W.ian methods by Paul Ziff and Morris Weitz in arguing that art can best be defined as a family resemblance concept is made problematic by difficulties in W.'s notion of family resemblances.

179. MAURY, ANDRÉ, *The Concepts of Sinn and Gegenstand in Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1977). 176 p.; ISBN 951-95053-8-5.

The author argues that the *Tractatus*' notion of propositional sense contains an irreducible modal element. An interpretation of W.'s early notion of »bipolarity» is given. W.'s early views on sense and modality are contrasted with Frege's and Russell's views. The author defends the view that the *Tractatus* objects include predicates, backing up his argument by reference to unpublished writings of W.'s.

180. MAURY, ANDRÉ, »A Point of Interest in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*», in Lauri Carlson, Jan von Plato and Esa Saarinen (eds.), *That and »That»: Essays in Honour of S. Albert Kivinen* (Helsinki: [s. n.], 1977): 5–10.

In his discussion of G. E. Moore in *On Certainty*, W. holds that there are a number of empirical propositions which are certain, but which cannot be assessed on the axis »known»/»not known» at all; they are in fact *too* certain to be assessed in that way. If this view of W.'s is accepted, the area where traditional scepticism can move is significantly diminished, for it detaches the sceptic's claim that a given proposition cannot be known from the conclusion that the proposition in question is uncertain.

181. MAURY, ANDRÉ, »Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language«, in Ingmar Pörn (ed.), *Essays in Philosophical Analysis: Dedicated to Erik Stenius on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1981): 149–167.

The notion of »limit of language« in the *Tractatus* is analyzed in connection with the nature of logic and the relation between language and reality.

182. MAURY, ANDRÉ, »Sources of the Remarks in Wittgenstein's *Zettel*«, *Philosophical Investigations* 4 (1981), 1: 57–74.

183. MAURY, ANDRÉ, »Reality and Logical Form«, *Synthese* 56 (1983): 171–180.

W.'s demand that the proposition display the logical form of reality (*Tractatus* § 2.18) raises a question whether this condition of truth can be shown to be fulfilled by any proposition. This is impossible, but W. nevertheless holds that any proposition (certainly) »shows« the logical form of reality. It follows from this that the question whether a predicate answers to the logical form of reality is decidable *a priori*.

184. MAURY, ANDRÉ, »Logical Form«, in Ghita Holmström and Andrew J. I. Jones (eds.), *Action, Logic and Social Theory: Dedicated to Ingmar Pörn on the Occasion of His 50th Birthday* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1985): 110–132.

In the *Tractatus*, logical form is a condition of factual truth. Yet the question whether a proposition fulfills this condition of truth is undecidable. So factual truth is, in the end, undecidable. This problem is discussed with reference to W.'s view of meaning as use, and to realism and antirealism as regards linguistic rules. It turns out that none of the options discussed give a satisfactory solution of the problem. It is also shown that a semantics in terms of »truth-conditions« collapses into a semantics in terms of rules.

185. MAURY, ANDRÉ, »The Structure of the Visual Field: Wittgenstein's Discussion in the *Philosophical Remarks*«, in Rudolf Haller and Johannes Brandl (eds.), *Wittgenstein: Towards a Re-Evaluation*, vol. 3 (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990): 93–96.

W.'s discussion of the visual field in the *Philosophical Remarks* has been ignored, perhaps due to his later attack on the role of empirical experience in philosophy. The discussion is nevertheless interesting with its suggestion that the geometry of visual experiences is not Euclidean, but indeterminate.

186. MAURY, ANDRÉ, »Sources of the Remarks in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*«, *Synthese* 98 (1994): 349–378.

187. MEHTONEN, LAURI, »Philosophie 'lässt alles wie es ist' oder die 'moderne Philosophie' als Kritik der 'alten Philosophie' und der Alltagswelt«, trans. Arnold Bruns, in Aleksander Peczenik and Jyrki Uusitalo (eds.), *Reasoning on Legal Reasoning* ([Helsinki]: Society of Finnish Lawyers, 1979): 219–230.

The alienation of people from their ordinary language, which according to W. is the main source of philosophical problems, is a reflection of their alienation from the modern industrial society they live in. The philosophy of W. can be seen as a fundamentally political attempt to reveal contradictions between people's intentions and their acts, which contradictions the bourgeois workaday world is liable to disguise.

188. MERSCH, DIETER (ed.), *Gespräche über Wittgenstein* (Wien: Passagen, 1991).
176 p.; ISBN 3-900767-66-1.

Includes a German translation of a 1989 interview with Jaakko Hintikka.

189. MOLANDER, JOAKIM, »Vad är ett privat språk?», *Ajatus* 54 (1997): 97–121.

A reading of W.'s private language argument building on the insights of Rush Rhees, Cora Diamond and Lars Hertzberg. According to W., the mastery of a natural language means much more than the ability to put words together in grammatically correct sentences. To master a language means participating in a social community where linguistic expressions are an essential part of human beings' everyday dealings with each other.

190. MÄNTYSALO, RAINE, »Text and Con-Text: The Dialogue of Environmental Meanings», *Nordia Geographical Publications* 25 (1996), 2: 41–48.

Drawing from communication theory and W.'s later philosophy, this article discusses about the nature of language, meaning, information, and communication – especially via the medium of built environment. Since all behaviour is taken here as communication, all types of environmental activities should also be considered as forms of communication via the environment – not just designing and building. The question is whether the designers and builders are willing and able to initiate environmental communication among users via those changes they make to the physical environment. Through professional education and socialization the former have become habituated to give meanings to their activities in reference to their subcultural professional contexts differentiated from the users'. Here the concept of dialogue is offered as a tool to bridge this difference; to structure shared environmental meanings on the basis of prior intersubjective pre-understanding. [AA]

191. NIEMI, ESA, »Filosofian tehtävä ja merkitys Wittgensteinilla», *Genesis* (1979), 2: 31–33.

A brief introductory article with reference to Maurice Cornforth's Marxist critique of W. as a conservative.

192. NIEMINEN, JARI, »Erehdys jota ilman et kestäisi: Niemisen järjestämiä fragmentteja», *Genesis* (1985), 1: 8–13.

A poststructuralist discussion of subject metaphysics and power, taking as its point of departure W.'s simile of the beetle in the box and his critique of Freud's notion of the unconscious.

193. NIEMINEN, TOMMI, »Merkityksen evoluutiomallista», in Urho Määttä and Klaus Laalo (eds.), *Kirjoituksia muoto- ja merkitysoipista* (Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto, Suomen kielen ja yleisen kielitieteen laitos, 1998): 117–141.

A sketch of an evolutionary »non-essentialist semantics», coupling W.'s notion of meaning as use with Peirce's model of the sign and Voloshinov's theory of the ideological content of linguistic meaning.

194. NIIRANEN, ERKKI, »Eräs elämänmuotojen määritelmä», *Genesis* (1983), 1: 28–30.

Pragmatics – the study of the influence of contexts on sentence meaning – provides a key to W.'s controversial notion of »forms of life». A form of life is defined by the author as the sum of all the pragmatic background assumptions which make possible the use of a given language. Various methodologies are proposed for the location and study of these assumptions.

195. NYMAN, HEIKKI, »Wittgenstein väreistä», in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Huomautuksia väreistä* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1982): 113–132.

A critical and historical discussion of W.'s remarks on colour.

196. NYMAN, HEIKKI, »Suomentajan jälkikirjoitus», in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Kirjoituksia 1929–1938* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1986): 171–227.

An intellectual biography of W. up to 1939, intertwined with philosophical discussions of the texts by him translated in item 345.

197. NYMAN, KAJ, »Wittgenstein Meaning Architecture», *DATUTOP* 10 (1986): 39–66.

Architecture is one of man's non-verbal languages. The search for meaning of built form can be compared with W.'s search for meaning in verbal language. Functionalism has some of the characteristics of W.'s picture theory: there is one meaning for every expression, or form is subordinated to function. A language like this means limiting the world in a way which reduces life. The later W. of *Philosophical Investigations* found out how the »higher», which is indescribable, can be *shown* in the language games. In the same way it is possible to recreate a language of built form, which recognizes the fact that meaning comes into being through practice – not only architects' practice but also the public's use of the built environment. Architects' practice must be renewed in such a way as to take as its starting point the age-old collective meanings – conventions – of architecture. A language governed by such rules has creative power. [AA]

198. NYSTRAND, STIG, »Om vissheter och livsformer», *Vasabladet*, 5 February 1982.

Review of *Om visshet*, Lars Hertzberg's Swedish translation of W.'s *Über Gewissheit*.

199. NYSTRAND, STIG, »Den nya synen på Wittgenstein», *Vasabladet*, 15 September 1982.

200. NYSTRAND, STIG, »Wittgenstein and Jaspers: How to Live in Borderlands», in Wolfgang L. Gombocz (ed.), *Philosophy of Religion* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1984): 190–195.

The ethical and existential side of W.'s thought can be illuminated by comparisons with a number of concepts coined by Jaspers.

201. NYSTRAND, STIG, »Private Experience and Public Communication», in Roderick M. Chisholm et al. (eds.), *Philosophy of Mind – Philosophy of Psychology* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1985): 499–504.

W.'s discussion of the linguistic role of pain and other private experiences has connections with the emphasis on the existential import of human communication in Continental thought.

202. NYSTRAND, STIG, »Vidga gränserna», *Arbetet*, 22 April 1985.

203. NYSTRAND, STIG, »When God Was Absent?», in Werner Leinfellner and Franz M. Wuketits (eds.), *The Tasks of Contemporary Philosophy* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1986): 355–360.

Shortly after returning to philosophy in 1929, W. identified value with the supernatural. This identification may be Jewish in that the inexpressible centre he claimed for man's life-world mirrors the anxiety at expressing the great inexpressible, the Jewish God. In notes made during W.'s 1937 stay in Norway, he expresses religious terror and loneliness that may be due to his feeling of God being locked out of his new way of doing philosophy.

204. NYSTRAND, STIG, »A Struggle at the Borders of Life and World: The Philosophy of Jaspers and Wittgenstein», *Yearbook of the Austrian Karl Jaspers Society* 3–4 (1989–1990).

- 204a. NYSTRAND, STIG, »A Struggle at the Borders of Life and World: The Philosophy of Jaspers and Wittgenstein», in Richard Wisser and Leonard H. Ehrlich (eds.), *Karl Jaspers, Philosopher Among Philosophers* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1993).

Reprint of item 204.

The paper seeks to illustrate similarities in Jaspers and W.'s view of man and of philosophy. Both philosophers are constantly aware of the importance of reaching for transcendence. Language is a boundary and a pointer to something beyond. Man as a communicating, acting and existentially responsible being is central to both thinkers.

205. NYSTRAND, STIG, *Att leva sin självbiografi: essäer om Ludwig Wittgenstein* (Stockholm: Carlssons, 1997).
125 p.; ISBN 91-7203-191-3.

Four long essays of a literary and existentialist flavour. They concern the writing process of the *Tractatus*; W.'s philosophy of life and his status as a philosopher of culture; and the relations of W.'s and Jaspers's conceptions of philosophy.

Review:

Rydén, Josef, *Historielärarnas förenings årsskrift* (1997–1998): 93–94.

206. NYSTRAND, STIG, »Ludwig Hänsel – Ludwig Wittgenstein: dialog», *Dialoger* 40 (1997): 30–35.

An essay on the friendship between Ludwig Hänsel and W. as reflected in their published correspondence, with the emphasis on Hänsel's role as a »dialogical 'you'» for W.

207. OJANEN, EERO, »Ludwig Wittgenstein: onko kielipelin pohjalla fasismi?», in *Filosofiat ja fasismi: puheenvuoroja eurooppalaisen kulttuurin tilasta* (Jyväskylä: Atena, 1989): 97–102.

This psychohistorical book examines the relationship of various European philosophers to fascism; in the chapter on W., the author interprets some features in his writings as signs of a partly subconscious recoil from the horrors of Nazism.

208. PASANEN, KIMMO, »Wittgensteinin estetiikasta», *Taide* 29 (1989), 3: 8–11.

Beginning from the paradox that while W. was deeply interested in all forms of art, he did not write extensively on aesthetics, the author describes his *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, his one substantial work on the subject, compiled from lecture notes. These consist of critical comments on mistaken beliefs prevalent in the current approach to aesthetic research, rather than attempts to create a systematic theory of aesthetics. The author suggests the application of W.'s remarks to the field of sculpture in particular, and their continuing relevance to aesthetic methodology. [AA]

209. PASANEN, KIMMO, »L'art et les jeux de langage selon Wittgenstein», *Revue d'esthétique* 24 (1993): 49–54.

A discussion of the understanding of art in light of W.'s notion of language games and the view of language as a universal means of communication. The author approaches these from a phenomenological perspective.

210. PIHLSTRÖM, SAMI, »A Solipsist in a Real World», *Dialectica* 50 (1996): 275–290.

- 210a. PIHLSTRÖM, SAMI, »A Solipsist in a Real World», in *Pragmatism and Philosophical Anthropology: Understanding Our Human Life in a Human World* (New York: Lang, 1998): 31–48.
Reprint of item 210.

It is trivially true that solipsism, the view that »the world is my world» and that whatever there is is ontologically dependent on my thought or language, cannot be conclusively refuted. The issue of solipsism is, however, an important one. The paper considers this issue mainly from the point of view of W.'s remarks on solipsism in the *Tractatus* and in his early *Notebooks*. It is argued that we should not accept W.'s idea that solipsism eventually coincides with »pure realism». A position labeled »pragmatic realism» is briefly sketched in order to avoid both solipsism and what the author calls »credo realism». The author tries to show that the issue of solipsism versus realism should not simply be dismissed and that it should be approached from a pragmatist perspective. [AA]

211. PIHLSTRÖM, SAMI, »Pragmatists as Transcendental Philosophers and Wittgenstein as a Pragmatist», in Paul Weingartner, Gerhard Schurz and Georg Dorn (eds.), *The Role of Pragmatics in Contemporary Philosophy* (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 1997): 763–769.

212. PIH[L]STRÖM, SAMI, »Jaakko Hintikka, Ludwig Wittgenstein ja vuosisatamme filosofian kahtiajako», *niin & näin* 5 (1998), 3: 38–48.

212a. PIHLSTRÖM, SAMI, »Hintikka, Wittgenstein ja vuosisatamme filosofian kahtiajako», in *Kokemuksen käytännölliset ehdot: kantilaisen filosofian uudelleenarviointia* (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 2002): 196–238.

Reprint of item 212 with minor changes.

A review article on Jaakko Hintikka's work on W., on the occasion of the publication of item 102. Hintikka views what he terms the »universal» and »calculus» conceptions of language as irreconcilable; he attributes the former to W. and the latter to himself, among others. However, both the dichotomy and W.'s place in it are problematic.

213. PIHLSTRÖM, SAMI, »Two Kinds of Methodological Solipsism», *Sats* 1 (2000), 2: 73–90.

The paper deals with an analogy between two philosophical positions: (1) the kind of methodological solipsism associated with Carnapian logical positivism and, more generally, with the entire post-Cartesian tradition in epistemology and in the philosophy of mind and language, and (2) the more socially oriented, late-W.ian philosophy of language, which constitutes the background of several influential philosophical treatments of the conditions of understanding human cultures and social forms of life. In the latter, the solipsistic »I«, the locus of all experience and meaning, is replaced by a social subject, »we«, but the position remains methodologically solipsistic, since experiences and meanings are still created from a first person point of view, on the basis of what is »given« to the (social) subject. The solipsism issue turns out to be fundamentally relevant to some basic concerns in the philosophy of science and of the social sciences, because even pragmatic and constructivist currents based on W.'s later work employ solipsistic methodological assumptions. [AA]

214. PIHLSTRÖM, SAMI, »Filosofian traditionaalisuudesta ja transsendentaalisuudesta», *niin & näin* 8 (2001), 1: 42–52.

214a. PIHLSTRÖM, SAMI, »Filosofian traditionaalisuudesta ja transsendentaalisuudesta», teoksessa *Kokemuksen käytännölliset ehdot: kantilaisen filosofian uudelleenarviointia* (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 2002): 136–174.

Reprint of item 214 with minor changes.

It is argued that W., along with Derrida, should be seen as a transcendental philosopher of a certain sort, *pace* the recent interpretations of Oskari Kuusela and Thomas Wallgren.

215. PIHLSTRÖM, SAMI, »Muutama sana transsendentaalisesta», *niin & näin* 8 (2001), 2: 3–5.

Reply to item 168, defending both the idea of W. as a post-Kantian transcendental thinker, and transcendental philosophy in general.

216. PIHLSTRÖM, SAMI, »'Im Anfang war die Tat': Wittgenstein, kielelliset käytännöt ja pragmatismi», in Sami Pihlström, Kristina Rolin and Floora Ruokonen (eds.), *Käytäntö* (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 2002): 301–313.

216a. PIHLSTRÖM, SAMI, »'Im Anfang war die Tat': Wittgenstein, kielelliset käytännöt ja pragmatismi», in *Kokemuksen käytännölliset ehdot: kantilaisen filosofian uudelleenarviointia* (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 2002): 176–195.

Reprint of item 216.

217. PIHLSTRÖM, SAMI, »Linguistic Practices and Transcendental Arguments: Taylor and Wittgenstein», in Arto Laitinen and Nicholas H. Smith (eds.), *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Charles Taylor* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 2002): 13–27.

Both Charles Taylor and W. have developed a critique of excessive naturalism by means of a culturalist, anthropologizing view of philosophy. This view is supported by a transcendental argument emphasizing the irreducible normativity that belongs to human forms of life and linguistic practices.

218. POPPER, KARL, »Filosofisten ongelmien luonne ja niiden juuret tieteessä», in *Arvauksia ja kumoamisia: tieteellisen tiedon kasvu* ([Helsinki]: Gaudeamus, 1995): 66–96.

Finnish translation by Eero Eerola of »The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science» (1952). The author discusses W.'s view that all genuine problems are scientific, that the alleged problems of philosophy are pseudo-problems, and that philosophy is not a theory but an activity.

219. PYLKKÖ, PAULI, »Unique Language Problem», in *The Aconceptual Mind: Heideggerian Themes in Holistic Naturalism* (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1998): 145–177.

W.'s discussion of private language is vitiated by behavioristic tendencies. The speech community, as he describes it, is »divided into identity-preserving speaker individuals who participate in nicely identifiable and separate language games». This prevents W. from appreciating the crucial role of aconceptual and asubjective experience in philosophical thinking.

220. PÖNKÄNEN, MATTI, »Kielitieteestä ja filosofiasta», in Kari Sajavaara (ed.), *Näkökulmia kieleen: AFinLA:n syysseminarium Jyväskylässä 26.–27.11.1976* (Helsinki: Suomen sovelletun kielitieteen yhdistys, 1977): 5–11.

A brief treatment of the picture theory of language in the *Tractatus*, and W.'s later criticisms of the theory by means of an attack on the Augustinian picture of language. According to W., language is a frame of human consciousness which constantly conditions how the world appears to us.

221. PÖRN, INGMAR, »Wittgensteins Tractatus», *Finsk tidskrift* 173–174 (1963): 238–241.

Review of Anders Wedberg's Swedish translation of W.'s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

222. RÉE, JONATHAN, »Englantilainen filosofia 1950-luvulla», *niin & näin* 1 (1994), 3: 6–25.

Finnish translation by Tuukka Tomperi of »English Philosophy in the Fifties» (1993). The author describes the philosophical atmosphere in England in the 1950s, including W.'s pervasive influence on Oxford and Cambridge philosophers.

223. REENPÄÄ, YRJÖ, »Nachwort», in *Über die Zeit: Darstellung und Kommentar einiger Interpretationen des Zeitlichen in der Philosophie: über die Zeit in den Naturwissenschaften* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1966): 80–83.

In the context of discussing the temporality of experience, the author attempts a further development of P. F. Strawson's critique of W.'s attack on the notion of a private language.

224. RINGBOM, MÅRTEN, »Wittgenstein och Wedberg», *Nya Argus* 56 (1963): 17–19.

Review of Anders Wedberg's Swedish translation of W.'s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

225. RUSSELL, BERTRAND, »Muutamia filosofisia kosketuksia», in *Muotokuvia muistista ja muita esseitä* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1957): 27–35.

Finnish translation by J. A. Hollo of »Philosophers and Idiots» (1955).

226. RUSSELL, BERTRAND, *Elämäni*, osa 2 (Porvoo: WSOY, 1968). 378 p., [5] p. of plates: illus.

Finnish translation by Eila Pennanen of *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 2 (1968). Includes extensive discussions of W.'s intellectual and personal relationship with Russell.

227. RUSSELL, BERTRAND, *Elämäni* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1990). 381 p., [24] p. of plates: illus.; ISBN 951-0-16581-6.

A shortened omnibus edition of item 226 and the other two volumes of Russell's *Autobiography*, without the appendices of letters.

228. SAARI, HEIKKI, »En grundläggande missuppfattning», *Vasabladet*, 18 October 1981.

Review of *Om visshet*, Lars Hertzberg's Swedish translation of W.'s *Über Gewissheit*.

229. SAARI, HEIKKI, »Wittgensteins särskilda anmärkningar», *Nya Argus* 77 (1984): 152–154.

Review of *Särskilda anmärkningar*, Lars Hertzberg's Swedish translation of W.'s *Vermischte Bemerkungen*.

230. SAARI, HEIKKI, »Cook and Winch on Understanding Magic», *Suomen Antropologi* 10 (1985): 134–141.

A defence of Peter Winch's W.ian views on understanding alien cultures against the criticisms of John W. Cook. In saying that alien cultures can be called fundamentally mistaken from our own point of view, Cook is right, but this does not mean that our own point of view should be the only one we can use in assessing these cultures.

231. SAARI, HEIKKI, »Wittgenstein uskonnollisen uskon varmuudesta», *Teologinen Aikakauskirja* 97 (1992): 190–196.

In his writings and lectures on religious belief, W. defends the view that religious beliefs, which get their meaning and justification from the traditions of cultures, practices and institutions, do not rest on a faulty conception of reality that can be criticized by reference to objective reality. Religious beliefs involve a commitment one has to accept as given in order to participate in the religious practices of one's community.

232. SAARI, HEIKKI, »Wittgenstein on Understanding Magic», *Suomen Antropologi* 18 (1993): 30–38.

In his *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*, W. emphasizes that we can hope to understand the ritual and religious practices of alien cultures when the context of the whole way of living of these cultures is taken into account. Whether a religious practice is an instrumentalist one or an emotive one can only be decided on a case-by-case basis.

233. SAARI, HEIKKI, »Wittgenstein om visshet och kunskapens förutsättningar», *Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift* 32 (1997): 181–194.

A discussion of the nature of the so-called »hinge propositions» in *On Certainty* and their role in backgrounding human experience.

234. SALMELA, PIA, »Wittgenstein ja filosofian luonne», *Kanava* 16 (1989): 550–554.

A brief introductory article to mark the centenary of W.'s birth.

235. SALOMÄKI, JUKKA, »Jumalan todellisuuden luonne D. Z. Phillipsin uskonnollista kieltä koskevissa tutkimuksissa», *Teologinen Aikakauskirja* 95 (1990): 403–408.

A discussion of D. Z. Phillips's views on religious belief, especially regarding the nature of God, and of W.'s influence on Phillips.

236. SALOMÄKI, JUKKA, »D. Z. Phillipsin käsitys uskonnollisesta uskosta», in Timo Koistinen and Juha Seppänen (eds.), *Usko ja filosofia* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Systemaattisen teologian laitos, 1993): 99–107.

Another introductory article on D. Z. Phillips's W.ian philosophy of religion.

237. SALONEN, TOIVO, »Keskeneräinen Wittgenstein-tutkimus», *Genesis* (1984), 4: 8–15.

A sketch of a study of W.'s thinking in the *Tractatus* and the *Prototractatus*, which are viewed as a Kantian investigation into the transcendental preconditions of perception and knowledge. W.'s unorthodox definition of the world as everything that is the case has affinities with process-oriented thinking in the Hegelian tradition. The discrepancies in the ordering of the propositions between the *Tractatus* and *Prototractatus* may help us get a clearer picture of W.'s intentions. For instance, the inconspicuous presence of *Tractatus* § 7 in the middle of the *Prototractatus* may mean that its importance to W.'s metaphysics has been exaggerated.

238. SALONEN, TOIVO, »Elämänkatsomustieto ja Ludwig Wittgenstein», in Irina Buchberger (ed.), *Opettaja ja aine 2000: ainedidaktiikan symposiumi 4. • 2. • 2000* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopiston opettajankoulutuslaitos, 2000): 788–797.

Discusses the implications of the figure of W., and of his writings, as a source of inspiration for philosophical education in Finnish schools.

239. SANDBACKA, CAROLA, *Understanding Other Cultures: Studies in the Philosophical Problems of Cross-Cultural Interpretation* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1987). 193 p.; ISBN 951-95055-8-X.

A study of philosophical problems arising from the understanding of human practices and beliefs in alien societies. Inspired by W. and by thinkers influenced by him, especially Peter Winch, its purpose is to show that the philosophical difficulties pertaining to the concept of understanding here are variations of difficulties within any attempt to understand human beliefs and behaviour. An understanding of alien beliefs and customs is connected with the understanding of customs and beliefs not alien; this kind of study is, by its very nature, different from an investigation within natural science.

240. SIITONEN, ARTO, »Review of Bachmaier's *Wittgenstein und Kant*», *Philosophy and History* 14 (1981): 133–134.

241. SIITONEN, ARTO, »*Tractatus*, schön und gut», *Grazer philosophische Studien* 21 (1984): 65–87.

The concept »sense» is used in the *Tractatus* in multiple ways, including an evaluative one. However, value predicates such as »beautiful» and »well» are categorized as nonsense. It is possible to differentiate between two kinds of nonsense in the *Tractatus*: (1) that which can be shown, and (2) that which is without any cognitive function. Mystical showing is demystified in W.'s later philosophy. [Modified AA]

242. SIITONEN, ARTO, »On the Concepts of Problem, Solution, Question and Answer in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*», in Roderick M. Chisholm et al. (eds.), *Philosophy of Mind – Philosophy of Psychology* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1985): 459–461.

The tension between a doctrinal and a purely methodological conception of philosophy in the *Tractatus* is illuminated by an examination of the role of problems and questions in the book.

243. SIITONEN, ARTO, »*Tractatus*: Projection / The Problematic Place of Humanities», in Werner Leinfellner and Franz M. Wuketits (eds.), *The Tasks of Contemporary Philosophy* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1986): 161–163.

In the *Tractatus*, W. considers projection as representation of the depicted by its depiction. The use of projection as a method of investigation is liable to lead to abstract studies of the mapping of structures onto each other. Such studies are relevant for humanities as well as for sciences.

244. SIITONEN, ARTO, »... as if *everything* were explained», in Paul Weingartner and Gerhard Schurz (eds.), *Logic, Philosophy of Science and Epistemology* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1987): 416–418.

W.'s disqualification of scientific laws as explanations of nature in *Tractatus* §§ 6.371–6.372 becomes more understandable when seen against views expressed by Norman Campbell in his book *What Is Science?* (1921).

245. SIITONEN, ARTO, »Scepticism, Silence, Ethics», in Ota Weinberger, Peter Koller and Alfred Schramm (eds.), *Law – Politics – Society* (Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1988): 217–221.

A discussion of the similarities and differences between the *Tractatus* and classical scepticism, especially that of Sextus Empiricus. The implication of W.'s sceptical stance for social and moral philosophy is also examined.

246. SIITONEN, ARTO, »On the Operational Interpretation of Logic and Mathematics in the *Tractatus*», in Paul Weingartner and Gerhard Schurz (eds.), *Philosophy of the Natural Sciences* (Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1989): 411–414.

Although the *Tractatus* gives an operational interpretation of logical constants and of numbers, W.'s philosophy has aims significantly different from those of »operative logics».

247. SIITONEN, ARTO, »Zum Sparen der logischen Ausdrucksmittel», in Rudolf Haller and Johannes Brandl (eds.), *Wittgenstein: eine Neubewertung*, vol. 3 (Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990): 35–40.

Remarks on the role of »original logical form» in the *Tractatus* and its critique of Frege's and Russell's logicism.

248. SIITONEN, ARTO, »Review of Stegmüller's *Kripkes Deutung der Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins*», *Philosophy and History* 24 (1991): 50–51.

249. SIITONEN, ARTO, »Logical Atomism Reconsidered», in Klaus Puhl (ed.), *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1993): 201–206.

Compares Russell's logical atomism to that of the *Tractatus* and discusses the relations of logical atomism to atomic theory in natural philosophy.

250. SILTALA, RAIMO, »The Quest for Ultimate Premises of the Law», *Oikeus* 27 (1998): 420–423.

W.'s example of the Paris standard metre is interpreted from a deconstructionist viewpoint as a sign of his inability to see the conventional nature of all know-ledge.

251. SILTALA, RAIMO, »Metrin pituudesta ja muita ongelmia», *Oikeus* 28 (1999): 304–310.

Reply to item 12. W.'s *On Certainty* provides more examples of his tendency to emphasize nature against convention.

252. SILVERMAN, DAVID, »Laadullisen tutkimuksen kuusi sääntöä: postromanttinen näkökulma», *Sosiologia* 25 (1988): 257–268.

Finnish translation by Päivi Heininen of »Rules of Qualitative Research» (1989). Qualitative sociology too easily succumbs to a »Romantic» impulse. In a sociological context, the Romantic seeks to understand raw »experience,» usually by the use of unstructured interviews. Such work can lack analytic rigour, failing to distinguish the sociologist from the journalist. Following W. and Garfinkel, the approach adopted here emphasizes the forms of representation and contexts which inform practical reasoning. It recommends a non-Romantic sociology – an aspiration curiously shared by Durkheim – and suggests some ways to pursue it. [AA]

253. SINTONEN, MATTI, »Stenius's Picture Theory and Bradley's Regress», in Ingmar Pörn (ed.), *Essays in Philosophical Analysis: Dedicated to Erik Stenius on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1981): 232–247.

It has been argued that Erik Stenius's version of W.'s picture theory of sentence meaning leads to Bradley's regress. If sentences are understood as concatenations of words, there seems always to be one more element in the propositional sign than there is in the fact pictured. The author argues that Stenius's account of meaning in terms of isomorphism avoids the regress.

254. STEINBOCK, DAN, *Sisäistetty herruus: politisoituneen luonteenrakenteen kritiikkiä; taiteellisen tutkimuksen kokeilu* (Helsinki: Otava, 1980).
254 p.; ISBN 951-1-05668-9.

In this book of social philosophy inspired by Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno, both the earlier and later philosophies of W. are frequently criticized as escapist, narcissistic, authoritarian, militaristic and masochistic.

255. STEINBOCK, DAN, »Wittgenstein ja edistykseen sokaisu: Alzo Sprach Apokalypse», in *Narsismin fasismi: vapautus eko- ja urbaanifasismien kourissa* (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1981): 219–272.

W. is approached as an apocalyptic thinker developing a Spenglerian philosophy of history. The facts of his life and his various remarks on philosophy of culture convey a picture of his helplessness and nausea in the face of modern Western industrial society. Special attention is paid to W.'s homoerotic inclinations and their possible influences on his personality.

256. STENBÄCK, ASSER, »Vetenskap och religion», *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 12 August 1995.

Reply to item 68. W. is dismissed as a cultural relativist and his philosophy is described as »a brew of linguistic analysis, Nietzsche, Marx and structuralist linguistics».

257. STENIUS, ERIK, »Verklighetens avbildning i språket», in *Eros och Eris: kulturessäer tillägnade Rolf Lagerborg* (Helsingfors: Söderström; Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1944): 286–297.

The first embryonic form of Stenius's interpretation of what he sees as the »picture theory of language» in the *Tractatus*.

258. STENIUS, ERIK, »Den språkliga beskrivningen som isomorf avbildning», *Ajatus* 16 (1950): 69–101.

259. STENIUS, ERIK, »Linguistic Structure and the Structure of Experience», *Theoria* 20 (1954): 153–172.

In the course of setting out a »picture theory» of his own which takes into consideration the distinction between objects and qualities, Stenius refers to the theory of language adhered to in the *Tractatus*, and compares his own theses to it.

260. STENIUS, ERIK, »Uppbyggnaden av Wittgensteins *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*», *Ajatus* 19 (1956): 121–138.

260a. STENIUS, ERIK, »Uppbyggnaden av Wittgensteins *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*», in Lars Hertzberg (ed.), *Essäer om Wittgenstein* (Stockholm: Thales, 1992): 13–31.

Reprint of item 260.

A presentation of the argumentative structure and numbering system of the *Tractatus*, considered as a literary work.

261. STENIUS, ERIK, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960).

xi, 241 p.

261a. STENIUS, ERIK, *Wittgensteins Traktat: Eine kritische Darlegung seiner Hauptgedanken* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969).

310 p. German translation by Wilhelm Bader of item 261.

261b. STENIUS, ERIK, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981).

xi, 241 p.; ISBN 0-313-23246-6. Reprint of item 261.

261c. STENIUS, ERIK, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996).

xi, 241 p.; ISBN 1-85506-493-6. Reprint of item 261 with errata.

This book interprets the semantic and metaphysical aspects of the *Tractatus* by examining the most significant steps in it, starting from questions of a historical or genetic nature. The picture theory, which the author exemplifies with statements drawn from ordinary language, constitutes the central theme. It revolves around the thesis that in the *Tractatus* predicates are genuine components of reality on a level with objects. In the final chapter, W.'s philosophy is held to be significantly closer to Kantian metaphysics than to contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy.

Reviews:

- Bergmann, Gustav, »Stenius on the *Tractatus*: A Special Review», *Theoria* 29 (1963): 176–204.
- Copi, Irving M., *Philosophical Review* 72 (1963): 382–390.
- Davie, I., *Tablet*, 6 May 1961: 440.
- Duthie, G. D., *Philosophical Quarterly* 12 (1962): 371–372.
- Garver, Newton, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 22 (1961): 276–277.
- Jarvis, Judith, »Professor Stenius on the *Tractatus*», *Journal of Philosophy* 58 (1961): 584–596.
- Nerlich, G. C., *Philosophical Books* 1 (1960), 4: 13–16.
- Nielsen, H. A., *Philosophical Studies (Maynooth)* 10 (1960): 265–266.
- [Pears, D. F.], »The Limits of What Can Be Said», *Times Literary Supplement*, 23 December 1960.
- Riverso, Emanuele, *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia* 15 (1962): 255–256.
- Shalom, Albert, *Études philosophiques* 16 (1961): 277–278.
- Shwayder, D. S., *Mind* 72 (1963): 275–288.
- Stegmüller, Wolfgang, »Ludwig Wittgenstein als Ontologe, Isomorphietheoretiker, Transzendentalphilosoph und Konstruktivist», *Philosophische Rundschau* 13 (1965): 116–152.
- Wolniewicz, Bogusław, *Ruch filozoficzny* 22 (1963), 1: 8–17.

262. STENIUS, ERIK, »Wittgensteins 'kritik av det rena språket'», *Societas Scientiarum Fennica: Årsbok* 38 (1960), 5: 1–14.

262a. STENIUS, ERIK, »Wittgensteinin 'puhtaan kielen kritiikki'», in Jaakko Hintikka and Lauri Routila (eds.), *Filosofian tila ja tulevaisuus* (Helsinki: Weilin + Göös, 1970): 45–58.

Finnish translation of item 262 by Juhani Pietarinen.

A discussion of the Kantian background of the *Tractatus* and the way in which W. can be seen to extend Kant's epistemology to the critique of language.

263. STENIUS, ERIK, »Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*», *Times Literary Supplement*, 17 February 1961.

Reply to Pears's review of item 261. In his book, Stenius discusses Russell's theory of descriptions adequately and also claims to have shown that W. believed in the world's analyzability into atomic facts.

264. STENIUS, ERIK, »Wittgenstein's Picture-Theory«, *Inquiry* 6 (1963): 184–195.

264a. STENIUS, ERIK, »Wittgenstein's Picture-Theory«, in Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard (eds.), *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: Macmillan, 1966): 313–323.
Reprint of item 264.

264b. STENIUS, ERIK, »Wittgenstein's Picture-Theory«, in Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard (eds.), *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (New York: Hafner Press, 1973): 313–323.
Reprint of item 264.

264c. STENIUS, ERIK, »Wittgenstein's Picture-Theory«, in Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard (eds.), *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1993): 313–323.
Reprint of item 264.

Reply to H. R. G. Schwyzer, »Wittgenstein's Picture-Theory of Language«, *Inquiry* 5 (1962): 46–64.

265. STENIUS, ERIK, »Review of Wittgenstein's *Philosophische Bemerkungen*«, *Philosophical Quarterly* 16 (1966): 371–372.

266. STENIUS, ERIK, »Review of Pitcher's *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*«, *Philosophical Quarterly* 16 (1966): 373–374.

267. STENIUS, ERIK, »Mood and Language-Game«, *Synthese* 17 (1967): 254–274.

- 267a. STENIUS, ERIK, »Mood and Language-Game», in J. W. Davies et al. (eds.), *Philosophical Logic* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969): 182–202.
Reprint of item 267.
268. STENIUS, ERIK, »Miss Anscombe's Retracting», *Analysis* 27 (1967): 86–96.
- Reply to G. E. M. Anscombe, »Retracting», *Analysis* 26 (1966): 33–36.
269. STENIUS, ERIK, »Satsen som funktion hos Frege och Wittgenstein», *Norsk filo-sofisk tidsskrift* 4 (1969): 9–23.
270. STENIUS, ERIK, »Review of Morrison's *Meaning and Truth in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*», *Philosophical Review* 79 (1970): 373–375.
271. STENIUS, ERIK, »Review of Wittgenstein's *Philosophische Grammatik*», *Philosophical Quarterly* 21 (1971): 376–377.
272. STENIUS, ERIK, *Critical Essays* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1972).
262 p.: illus.; ISBN 0-7204-2405-4.
Incorporates material from items 259 and 268.
273. STENIUS, ERIK, »Wittgenstein and Ogden», *Philosophical Quarterly* 25 (1975): 62–68.
- Critical notice of W.'s *Letters to C. K. Ogden*.
274. STENIUS, ERIK, »Die Bildtheorie des Satzes», *Erkenntnis* 9 (1975): 35–55.

275. STENIUS, ERIK, »The Sentence as a Function of Its Constituents in Frege and the *Tractatus*», in Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), *Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G. H. von Wright* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976): 71–84.

275a. STENIUS, ERIK, »L'enunciato come funzione dei suoi costituenti in Frege e nel *Tractatus*», in Marilena Andronico, Diego Marconi and Carlo Penco (eds.), *Capire Wittgenstein* (Genova: Marietti, 1988): 87–100.

Italian translation of item 275 by Giancarlo Mezzanatto.

276. Stenius, Erik, »*Anschauung* and Formal Proof: A Comment on *Tractatus* 6.244», in Elisabeth Leinfellner et al. (eds.), *Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1978): 162–170.

276a. STENIUS, ERIK, »*Anschauung* und formaler Beweis», *Studia Leibnitiana* 13 (1981): 133–146.

Revised and expanded German version of item 276.

With reference to *Tractatus* § 6.233 it is shown that by formalization the inspection (*Anschauung*) of a figure in a Euclidean geometrical proof is not eliminated as evidence in geometrical proof but takes the form of an inspection of formal relations of symbolic expressions.

277. STENIUS, ERIK, »The Picture Theory and Wittgenstein's Later Attitude to It», in Irving Block (ed.), *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell; Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981): 110–139.

It is incorrect to maintain that the later W. rejected the picture theory of the *Tractatus*, a variant of which is moreover correct as a philosophical theory of language.

278. STENIUS, ERIK, »Comments», *Theoria* 50 (1984): 267–309.

Reply to Julian Young, »Wittgenstein, Kant, Schopenhauer and Critical Philosophy», and to item 285, both in the same volume.

279. STENIUS, ERIK, *Critical Essays*, vol. 2 (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1989).
392 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-9264-04-3.

Incorporates material from items 268, 273, 274, 275, 276 and 277.

280. SUOLINNA, KIRSTI, »Review of Gellner's *Language and Solitude: Wittgenstein, Malinowski and the Habsburg Dilemma*», *Acta Sociologica* 42 (1999): 396–397.

281. SÄÄTELÄ, SIMO, »Wittgenstein on 'Aesthetic Reactions'», in Yrjö Sepänmaa (ed.), *Real World Design: The Foundation and Practice of Environmental Aesthetics* (Lahti: University of Helsinki, Lahti Research and Training Centre, 1997): 111–115.

- 281a. SÄÄTELÄ, SIMO, »'Perhaps the Most Important Thing in Aesthetics': Wittgenstein on 'Aesthetic Reactions'», *Revue internationale de philosophie* 56 (2002): 49–72.

Revised and expanded version of item 281.

An examination of W.'s notion of »aesthetic reactions» shows how his aesthetics cannot be separated from the main concerns of his philosophy. The notion enables us to describe the grammar of aesthetic judgements in a way that recognizes important points made in classical aesthetics, for instance by Kant, but in a way that is consonant with W.'s own views of language and psychological concepts.

282. SÄÄTELÄ, SIMO, *Aesthetics as Grammar: Wittgenstein and Post-Analytic Philosophy of Art* (Uppsala: University of Uppsala, Department of Aesthetics, 1998).
xxi, 298 p.

Attempts to assess the significance of W.'s later thought for philosophical

aesthetics, both by showing its direct relevance and by criticizing certain prevalent misunderstandings of it. Chapter 1 deals with the application to philosophical aesthetics of the idea that philosophy is concerned with a grammatical investigation, which means clarification of concepts as well as therapeutical analysis of various philosophical diseases. This conception is developed with reference to Ben Tilghman's and Stanley Cavell's work, and it is contrasted to the prevailing understanding of W. within analytic aesthetics. In the following chapters this approach is brought to bear on some central problems in philosophical aesthetics. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes Arthur Danto's idea that a theory-dependent interpretation would be required for a thing to be »transfigured» into a work of art. W.'s remarks on aspect perception will be used to counter these claims and help us get a clearer view of the problems at issue. Chapter 3 shows how W.'s appeal to »aesthetic reactions» can offer an alternative to such an interpretive view of understanding. The first part deals with the relation of the notion of aesthetic reactions to that of »primitive reactions», the appeal to which has a central but frequently misunderstood role in W.'s later philosophy. The second part is devoted to showing how aesthetic reactions are involved in our traffic with art. Chapter 4 explores the close connection between understanding art and understanding human beings, which is highlighted through the idea of an »attitude» (*Einstellung*). Understanding this kind of attitude proves to be of utmost importance if we want to describe how the nature of our involvement with works of art is similar to our relations to persons. Thus chapters 3 and 4 attempt to show that the problem of understanding is practical in its nature, having to do with how we can come to react to objects as works of art and how they can come to play an important role in our lives and be objects of attitudes typical of our relation to art. [AA]

Review:

Lyas, Colin, *Nordisk estetisk tidskrift* 18 (1999): 89–103.

283. SÄÄTELÄ, SIMO, »Filosofian esteettisyys: Wittgenstein ja 'esteettinen käänne'», in Arto Haapala and Jyrki Nummi (eds.), *Aisthesis ja poiesis: kirjoituksia estetiikasta ja kirjallisuudesta* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Taiteiden tutkimuksen laitos, 2000): 73–98.

A discussion of the aesthetic dimension in W.'s thought and writings, and the possibility that they may have foreshadowed a recent »aesthetic turn» in philosophy comparable to the earlier »linguistic turn».

284. SÄÄTELÄ, SIMO, »Art, Opinions and Attitudes», in Rudolf Haller and Klaus Puhl (eds.), *Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2001): 258–263.

The notion of »attitude» in connection with art does not have to be connected with psychologistic attitude theories. Rather, following the suggestion of B. R. Tilghman, an attitude to a work of art can be seen as analogous to an attitude towards one's fellow human beings, which W. describes as the attitude that they have souls, as opposed to an opinion to that effect. To see something as a work of art means to see it as filled with a certain meaning, the way we can see someone's gestures and expressions as humanly meaningful.

285. TENGSTRÖM, LEIF, »Get the Picture?», *Theoria* 50 (1984): 256–266.

Discusses the idea of a »picture theory of sentence meaning» with special reference to the versions of it formulated by W. and by Erik Stenius; an attack on the picture theory by P. M. S. Hacker is criticized.

286. THÖLIX, BIRGER, »Wittgensteins skisser», *Vasabladet*, 28 October 1978.

Review of *Filosofiska undersökningar*, Anders Wedberg's Swedish translation of W.'s *Philosophische Untersuchungen*.

287. TOLONEN, TUOMAS, »Über die Hermeneutik von Karl-Otto Apel», *Ajatus* 33 (1971): 280–286.

Contrasts Apel's philosophy with W.'s view that the laws of logic and mathematics are rules having to do with human action.

288. TOUKONEN, MARJA LEENA, »Lukutaidon käsite Wittgensteinin myöhäisfilosofian valossa», *Aikuiskasvatus* 10 (1990): 82–87.

The author deals with the concepts of traditional literacy and functional literacy and then examines the concept of literacy in light of W.'s thoughts. Among other things, she examines W.'s language games. According to the author, a person can be and is illiterate with regard to new language games whose terminology differs from ones learned previously. [AA]

289. TUKIAINEN, ARTO, »Ylevä ja banaali etiikka: tapaus Wittgenstein», *niin & näin* 5 (1998), 3: 38–48.

W.'s views on ethics are shot through with vertical and hierarchical images familiar from the Judaeo-Christian tradition. For him, ethical value is something supernatural and transcendental, and ethical judgements are absolute. The author contrasts W.'s »sublime» conception of ethics with a »banal» one which seeks to neutralize and destroy the vertical imagery.

290. TUKIAINEN, ARTO, *Etiikka ja filosofia: eräiden Wittgensteinin näkemysten kriittikkiä* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, Filosofian laitos, 1999).
163 p.; ISBN 951-45-8633-6.

A critical study of W.'s views on ethics and moral philosophy as set out primarily in his 1929 lecture on ethics. The author's view is that W. was wrong to hold that ethical value cannot be thought of or spoken about.

Review:

Uschanov, Tommi, »Wittgenstein ja etiikka«, *Minervan pöllö* 21 (1999), 4: 27–31.

291. TUKIAINEN, ARTO, »Filosofisen toiminnan henkilökohtaisuudesta«, *Ajatus* 56 (1999): 273–280.

A discussion of the personal in philosophizing, taking as a starting point W.'s remark that work in philosophy is work on one's self.

292. TUKIAINEN, ARTO, »Asiaa Uschanoville«, *Minervan pöllö* 22 (2000), 1: 12–15.

Reply to Uschanov's review of item 290.

293. TUKIAINEN, ARTO, »Wittgenstein pähkinänkuoressa«, *Minervan pöllö* 22 (2000), 2: 22–23.

Reply to item 303.

294. TUOMELA, RAIMO, »Psychological Concepts and Functionalism«, in Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), *Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G. H. von Wright* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976): 364–393.

Discusses the problem of the conceptual, epistemological and ontological nature of »inner« psychological states, taking W.'s philosophy of psychology as one starting point.

295. TYÖRINOJA, REIJO, »Wittgenstein ja nuorallatanssimisen vaikeus«, *Vartija* 93 (1980): 10–18.

An introductory article on some major themes in W.'s philosophy of religion.

296. TYÖRINOJA, REIJO, *Uskon kielioppi: uskonnollisten väitteiden ja käsitteiden luonne Ludwig Wittgensteinin myöhäisfilosofian valossa* (Helsinki: Suomalainen teologinen kirjallisuusseura, 1984). 299 p.; ISBN 951-9111-52-2.

An analysis of the nature of religious claims and concepts in light of a detailed textual study of W.'s remarks on religious belief. – Reprinted 1986.

Reviews:

Hertzberg, Lars, *Teologinen Aikakauskirja* 90 (1985): 146–147.

Knuuttila, Simo, »Grammatica religiosa», *Ajatus* 42 (1985): 184–187.

297. TYÖRINOJA, REIJO, »Private Language and Religious Experience», in Wolfgang L. Gombocz (ed.), *Philosophy of Religion* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1984): 167–169.

W.'s attack on the notion of private language is also applicable to religion. It is not possible to let the meaning of religious language depend on private immediate experience, if one still wants to speak meaningfully about the object of religious experiences.

298. TYÖRINOJA, REIJO, »Uskonnollisuus ja kieli», *Teologinen Aikakauskirja* 89 (1984): 457–459.

Review of I. U. Dalferth's *Religiöse Rede von Gott*. Dalferth's critiques of the use of the notion of God in analytic philosophy of religion do not apply to W., who is quite close to Dalferth's own views.

299. TYÖRINOJA, REIJO, »Onko 'wittgensteinilainen teologia' mahdollista?», *Teologinen Aikakauskirja* 90 (1985): 169–176.

Discusses the possibility that there might be a distinctive W.ian theology along the lines of Platonic, Aristotelian, idealistic and other such theologies. Such a theology would not be a separate language game in the language, as some have suggested, but would have to emphasize W.'s view that the function of religious language is a grammatical one and not a fact-stating one.

300. TYÖRINOJA, REIJO, »Wittgenstein on Natural Attitudes», in Kjell S. Johannessen and Tore Nordenstam (eds.), *Culture and Value: Philosophy and the Cultural Sciences* (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 1995): 139–144.

For W., natural attitudes represent a »transcendental signified» in grounding ordinary human discourse and activity.

301. TYÖRINOJA, REIJO, »Wittgenstein and Postmodernism», in Timo Koistinen and Tommi Lehtonen (eds.), *Philosophical Studies in Religion, Metaphysics and Ethics: Essays in Honour of Heikki Kirjavainen* (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Society, 1997): 160–178.

Although the thinking of W. has significant similarities with postmodern philosophers such as Derrida, the existing differences outweigh these. For Derrida, natural attitudes are always something metaphysical and undesirable, while for W., they form a legitimate and indispensable part of human life. W.'s defence of natural attitudes in philosophy mirrors Merleau-Ponty's criticism of Husserl's attack on them.

302. USCHANOV, TOMMI, »Wittgensteinin *Tractatus* logiikan kritiikkinä», *niin & näin* 5 (1998), 3: 14–17.

Standard interpretations of W.'s *Tractatus* as an attempt to criticize Frege's and Russell's logicist programme constructively are mistaken. The anti-metaphysical »correct method of philosophy» discussed in *Tractatus* § 6.53 is not the method followed in the book itself, and *a fortiori* it is not the method W. recommends to his readers. Following James Conant, the *Tractatus* should rather be seen as a partly satirical *reductio ad absurdum* of Frege's and Russell's metaphilosophical aspirations. In this sense it is a closer forerunner of W.'s later writings than is usually thought.

303. USCHANOV, TOMMI, »Vastaus Tukiaiselle», *Minervan pöllö* 22 (2000), 1: 16–22.

Reply to item 282.

304. USCHANOV, TOMMI, »Wittgenstein ja transsendentaalinen vielä kerran», *niin & näin* 8 (2001), 4: 6–7.

Reply to items 214 and 215. Pihlström's unwillingness to discuss W. in a scholarly manner and as a historical figure is incomprehensible in view of his willingness to bandy the name of W. about. The worries expressed by Pihlström about the possibility of normative philosophy evaporate when it is seen that philosophy neither suppresses nor facilitates normativity, which is the responsibility of all human beings and not just philosophers.

305. USCHANOV, T. P., »Ernest Gellner's Criticisms of Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language Philosophy», in Gavin Kitching and Nigel Pleasants (eds.), *Marx and Wittgenstein: Knowledge, Morality and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2002): 23–46.

A discussion of the anthropologist Ernest Gellner's attacks on W. and the ordinary-language tradition in analytic philosophy, with special reference to Gellner's books *Words and Things* (1959) and *Language and Solitude* (1998). Gellner's reading of W. as an extreme irrationalist and cultural relativist is a crude caricature with only tenuous links to reality. However, it has exercised an enormous and often tacit influence on the reception of W.'s thought in various intellectual traditions hostile towards him.

306. USCHANOV, TOMMI, »Huomautuksia kuolemasta: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951)«, in Markku Roinila and Timo Kaitaro (eds.), *Filosofin kuolema* (Helsinki: Summa, 2002).

An essay discussing many of W.'s remarks on death in the *Tractatus* and elsewhere, and giving a detailed account of his own death.

307. USCHANOV, TOMMI, »Synkkä ja myrskyinen vesilasi«, *Yliopisto* 50 (2002), 15: 28–29.

Review of Edmonds and Eidinow's *Wittgenstein's Poker*.

308. USCHANOV, TOMMI, »Jaakko Hintikka ja filosofian nykytila«, *Tieteessä tapahtuu* 20 (2002), 1: 35–36.

Reply to item 109. Contrary to the impression Hintikka would like to give, a deep consensus exists among specialist scholars to the effect that Hintikka's reading of W. is egregiously untenable in all of its main contentions. The accusation of special pleading, which Hintikka has levelled at scholars such as Rhees and Anscombe, fits Hintikka's own work considerably better.

309. VALPOLA, VELI, »Keskustelua loogisen empirismin kritiikistä ja vähän muustakin«, *Suomalainen Suomi* 19 (1951): 35–37.

Reply to item 145. Kare confuses logical empiricism with formal logic, and the impression he gives that the latter is in decline is completely false. The devotion of the logical empiricists to logical questions is an activity in the sense of the word used by W. in the *Tractatus*. Following Descartes, Leibniz and W., philosophy should stick to logical clarification; the more social aspects of language should be studied by sociologists, not philosophers.

310. VALPOLA, VELI, »Ludwig Wittgenstein – 'filosofianfilosofi'», *Helsingin Sanomat*, 1 February 1952.

Apparently the first article in Finnish to be devoted entirely to W. The author gives a brief account of W.'s life and personality on the basis of information then available, and also discusses some main themes of the *Tractatus*.

311. VIHILA, MINNA, »Review of Harris's *Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein*», *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 98 (1997): 433–435.

312. VILKKO, RISTO, »Remarks on Bernays vs. Wittgenstein», in Rudolf Haller and Klaus Puhl (eds.), *Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2001): 351–356.

Examines the fragmentary manuscript sources for W.'s *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, arguing that Paul Bernays's notorious 1959 attack on the book stemmed at least partly from his regarding it as a scholarly monograph on mathematics, instead of a diffuse collection of philosophical remarks intended to complement the *Philosophical Investigations*.

313. VIRTANEN, SATU, »Wittgenstein: lyhyt oppimäärä», *Alkorytmi* (1998), 2: 12–13.

A short introductory article in a humorous vein.

314. VÄÄNÄNEN, JOUKO, »Wittgenstein och matematikens filosofi», *Nordisk matematisk tidskrift* 35 (1987): 98–100.

The author discusses and illustrates by means of examples the main ideas of W.'s theory regarding the foundations, basic concepts and proofs in mathematics. [AA]

315. WAHLSTRÖM, BERTEL, »The Indefinability of Religion», *Temenos* 17 (1981): 101–115.

Using the aesthetician Morris Weitz's notion of »open concepts», which builds on W.'s anti-essentialist conception of word meaning, the author argues that »religion» is an open concept and as such it does not permit of an exhaustive, all-encompassing definition. All the proposed definitions of the word seem to be fatally susceptible to counterexamples.

316. WAHLSTRÖM, BERTEL, »The Relativity of Meaning», *Religious Studies* 22 (1986): 205–217.

Attacks John Skorupski's critique of Peter Winch and other W.ian philosophers of social science in »The Meaning of Another Culture's Beliefs» (1978). Skorupski's reading of these philosophers as relativists is based on misunderstandings and conceptual confusions.

317. WAHLSTRÖM, BERTEL, *Religious Action: A Philosophical Analysis* (Åbo: Åbo Academy Press, 1987).
205 p.; ISBN 951-9498-17-6.

Seeks to elucidate the concept of religion through an analysis of the connection between religious action and other religious phenomena. Taking his main inspiration from W. and philosophers inspired by him, the author argues that religion is always practiced within the bounds of some human tradition or other, and that scholarship wishing to approach religion from a tradition-neutral stance, whether sympathetic or hostile, is therefore doomed to failure.

318. WAHLSTRÖM, BERTEL, »On Religious Decline and the Disappearance of Values», *Temenos* 25 (1989): 93–101.

A discussion of secularization and the erasure of religious outlooks in modern industrial society, partly from the standpoint of W.'s philosophy of religion.

319. WAHLSTRÖM, BERTEL, »Minnen av en filosof», *Finsk tidskrift* 241–242 (1997): 64–67.

Review of *Minnen av Wittgenstein*, Thomas Warburton's Swedish translation of Malcolm's *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*.

320. WALLGREN, THOMAS, »Politikens konst: Wittgenstein och den kritiska teorin», in Ilpo Halonen, Timo Airaksinen and Ilkka Niiniluoto (eds.), *Taito: Suomen filosofisen yhdistyksen Helsingissä 11.–12. • 1. • 1990 järjestämän kollokvion esitelmät* (Helsinki: Suomen filosofinen yhdistys, 1992): 279–301.

Discusses the similarities and differences between W. and the critical theory of the Frankfurt school. It is noted that both W. and critical theorists are deeply suspicious of modern industrial society.

321. WALLGREN, THOMAS, *The Challenge of Philosophy: Beyond Contemplation and Critical Theory* (Helsinki: [s. n.], 1996).
ii, ii, 202, xiv p.

Critical theory and W.'s later philosophy are the main reference points of this book, which is an examination of a number of competing conceptions of a »first philosophy«, and an effort to answer the question of what philosophy's relation to its times should be.

322. WALLGREN, THOMAS, »Varieties of Enlightenment Optimism: Discourse Ethics and Wittgensteinian Particularism in Conversation«, in Lilli Alanen, Sara Heinämaa and Thomas Wallgren (eds.), *Commonality and Particularity in Ethics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997): 306–342.
323. WALLGREN, THOMAS, »'Grammatical' and 'Weak Transcendental' Readings of the Later Wittgenstein: Is There a Difference?«, in Uwe Meixner and Peter Simons (eds.), *Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age*, vol. 2 (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 1999): 331–335.

The various attempts to find a middle ground between transcendental and non-transcendental readings of W.'s discussion of private language are liable to collapse into one or the other.

324. WALLGREN, THOMAS, »Hintikka's Later Wittgenstein: Some Problems«, *Sats* 2 (2001), 2: 98–119.

Jaakko Hintikka believes that all philosophers must subscribe either to the view of language as a universal medium or to the view of language as calculus. Hintikka himself defends the calculus view of language, which he considers the minority view in twentieth-century philosophy. His critique of the ineffability view is motivated by his notion that it undermines the idea of analytical philosophy as a systematic, problem-solving endeavour, paving the way for irresponsible relativism. Hintikka believes that W., throughout his career, maintained that semantics is ineffable, but the author argues that Hintikka is mistaken in this. As it would be implausible to attribute the competing calculus view to W., this finding implies that Hintikka's suggested »grand distinction« between the two views does not have the kind of generality he attributes to it. Generalizing on the same finding, the author goes on to argue that Hintikka gets W. wrong in the same way as some of the anti-constructive philosophers he criticizes, including Richard Rorty. Like Rorty, Hintikka reads the later W.'s philosophy of language as destructive for philosophy's commitment to reason. The author suggests that such readings of W. fail to give an adequate account of how W. transforms, but does not destroy or delegitimize, that very commitment. [Modified AA]

325. WALLGREN, THOMAS, »Lofty Ladders, Rough Ground: Learning from Hacker vs. Diamond«, in Rudolf Haller and Klaus Puhl (eds.), *Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2001): 364–369.

The author attempts to stake off a middle ground in the controversy between P. M. S. Hacker and Cora Diamond over the role of nonsense in the *Tractatus*. He suggests that Hacker's and Diamond's critiques of each other are both equally compelling, and that the two philosophers share the mistake of approaching W.'s notion of nonsense as unambiguous, which it is not.

326. WALLGREN, THOMAS, »Literally Nonsense«, *Philosopher's Magazine* 15 (2001): 48–49.

Review of Cray and Read's *The New Wittgenstein*.

327. WILSON, COLIN ST. JOHN, »Leikin käyttö ja käytön leikki», *Arkkitehti* 83 (1986), 2–3: 108–116.

Finnish translation by Harald Arnkil of »The Play of Use and the Use of Play: An Interpretation of Wittgenstein's Comments on Architecture» (1986). The common bond between Adolf Loos, Karl Kraus and W. was that they shared a body of critical thought in the relationship of art to society in which traditionalism and modernism are brought together in a tough-minded and unique way. W.'s view was that architecture exists to glorify, and that an age in which there is nothing to glorify, such as the twentieth century, is bound to make genuine architecture impossible.

328. WINCH, PETER, *Yhteiskuntatieteet ja filosofia* (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1979).
138 p.; ISBN 951-20-1723-7.

Finnish translation by Ilkka Malinen of *The Idea of a Social Science* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).

Review:

Mehtonen, Lauri, »Arkikokemus ja totuus yhteiskuntatieteissä», *Sosiologia* 18 (1981): 162–165.

329. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus eli Loogis-filosofinen tutkielma* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1971).
xii, 88 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-0-03895-4.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922). – Reprinted 1972, 1984 (with corrections), 1996, 1997.

Reviews:

Krohn, Leena, »Surullisen hahmon filosofi», *Helsingin Sanomat*, 30 May 1971.

Rossi, Lauri, »Wittgensteinin 'anti' nyt suomen kielellä», *Kansan Uutiset*, 1 May 1971.

330. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, »Muistiinpanoja vuodelta 1916», *Parnasso* 22 (1972): 449–460.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of excerpts from *Tagebücher 1914–1916*, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (first pub. 1960).

331. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, »Huomautuksia James Frazerin teokseen *The Golden Bough*», *Parnasso* 23 (1973): 292–304.

Finnish translation by Jöns Carlson of »Bemerkungen über Frazers *The Golden Bough*», ed. Rush Rhees, long version (first pub. 1967).

332. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, »Keskusteluja Freudista», *Parnasso* 24 (1974): 85–93.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of »Conversations on Freud», ed. Cyril Barrett (first pub. 1966).

333. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Varmuudesta* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1975).
144 p.; ISBN 951-0-06646-X.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of *Über Gewissheit*, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (first pub. 1969). – Reprinted 1999, 2001.

Reviews:

Carlson, Jöns, »Wittgensteinin viimeiset», *Helsingin Sanomat*, 20 May 1975.

Räty, Arvi, *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, 11 April 1975.

334. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, »Esitelmä etiikasta», *Parnasso* 25 (1975): 154–161.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of »A Lecture on Ethics» (first pub. 1965).

335. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Muistikirjoja 1914–1916* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1977).
188 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-0-07883-2.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of *Tagebücher 1914–1916*, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (first pub. 1960).

Reviews:

Knuuttila, Simo, »Nuoren Wittgensteinin sanat», *Helsingin Sanomat*, 6 March 1977.

Määttänen, Jukka, »Sade sataa aina», *Uusi Suomi*, 30 May 1977.

Nystrand, Stig, »Lyckan kan bara upplevas», *Vasabladet*, 13 May 1977.

Vaarala, Olli, »Lisälehtiä Tractatukseen», *Kaleva*, 18 February 1977.

336. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Zettel: filosofisia katkelmia* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1978).
159 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-0-08289-9.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of *Zettel*, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (first pub. 1967).

Reviews:

Knuuttila, Simo, »Elämän muotojen kielioppia», *Helsingin Sanomat*, 14 August 1978.

Vaarala, Olli, »Tiedon ja ajattelun perusteita», *Kaleva*, 11 June 1978.

337. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Yleisiä huomautuksia* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1979).
152 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-0-08812-9.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, ed. G. H. von Wright (first pub. 1977). – The translation follows the expanded selection of remarks in *Culture and Value*, Peter Winch's English translation.

Reviews:

Knuutila, Simo, »Ajatus taistelee itsensä valoon», *Helsingin Sanomat*, 25 March 1979.

Stålhammar, Leo, »Elää ja ajatella», *Suomenmaa*, 9 August 1979.

Vaarala, Olli, »Ajatusten kirkkautta», *Kaleva*, 26 April 1979.

Väyrynen, Kari, »Modernin ajattelun klassikko», *Genesis* (1979), 2: 30.

338. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Sininen ja ruskea kirja* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1980).
299 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-0-09603-2.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of *The Blue and Brown Books*, ed. Rush Rhees (first pub. 1958). – Reprinted 1999, 2001.

Reviews:

Saari, Heikki, *Ajatus* 45 (1988): 194–198.

Sivonen, Pekka, »Mielivaltaisten sääntöjen kielipelit», *Aamulehti*, 31 May 1980.

339. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Filosofisia tutkimuksia* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1981).
357 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-0-10205-9.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees (first pub. 1953). – Reprinted 1999, 2001.

Reviews:

Kannisto, Heikki, »Kielen rajat ja mielen kuhmut», *Helsingin Sanomat*, 3 July 1981.

Suvanto, Antti, »Wittgenstein ei säästä ajattelun vaivalta», *Aamulehti*, 30 May 1981.

340. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, »Luentoja uskonnollisesta uskosta», *Vartija* 94 (1981): 27–34, 58–70.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of »Lectures on Religious Belief», ed. Cyril Barrett (first pub. 1966).

341. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, »Luentoja estetiikasta», *Parnasso* 31 (1981): 425–438, 475–490.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of »Lectures on Aesthetics», ed. Cyril Barrett (first pub. 1966).

342. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Huomautuksia väreistä* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1982).
137 p.; ISBN 951-0-11065-5.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of *Bemerkungen über die Farben*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe (first pub. 1977).

Reviews:

Kauppi, Raili, »Wittgenstein ja värien kielipeli», *Aamulehti*, 4 June 1982.

Leikola, Anto, »Filosofin värisuora», *Helsingin Sanomat*, 13 May 1982.
Määttänen, Jukka, »Wittgensteinin harmaa liekki», *Uusi Suomi*, 8 May 1982.

Räty, Arvi, »Filosofisia värikäsityksiä», *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, 14 May 1982.

Saari, Heikki, »Huomautuksia väreistä», *Kanava* 10 (1982): 445–448.

Saari, Heikki, *Ajatus* 45 (1988): 194–198.

Siukonen, Jyrki, »Värien filosofiaa», *Taide* 23 (1982), 3: 51.

343. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Filosofisia huomautuksia* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1983).
351 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-0-11718-8.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, ed. Rush Rhees (first pub. 1964). – The Finnish edition has been revised by the translator and features remarks not included in the German edition.

344. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Huomautuksia matematiikan perusteista* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1985).
381 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-0-12744-2.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik*, rev. ed., eds. G. E. M. Anscombe, Rush Rhees and G. H. von Wright (first pub. 1974).

Reviews:

Kauppi, Raili, »Ludwig Wittgenstein ja matematiikan kielipeli», *Aamulehti*, 2 June 1985.

Väänänen, Jouko, »Wittgenstein tarttuu matematiikkaan – ja saa aikaan hävi-tyksen ja skandaalin», *Helsingin Sanomat*, 24 September 1985.

345. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Kirjoituksia 1929–1938* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1986).
235 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-0-13366-3.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of »Some Remarks on Logical Form» (1929); »A Lecture on Ethics» (first pub. 1965); »Bemerkungen über Frazers *The Golden Bough*», ed. Rush Rhees, short version (first pub. 1979); »Wittgenstein's Notes for Lectures on 'Private Experience' and 'Sense Data'», ed. Rush Rhees (first pub. 1968); »Ursache und Wirkung: Intuitives Erfassen», ed. Rush Rhees (first pub. 1976).

Reviews:

Hänninen, Juha, »Mistä ei voi puhua, siitä on vaiettava», *Kaleva*, 12 May 1986.

Kuisma, Juha, »Räjähteitä kielipilviin», *Aamulehti*, 25 May 1986.

Mäkinen, Erkki, »Tuntemattomat aivoitukset», *Turun Sanomat*, 30 June 1986.

Ojanen, Eero, »Filosofian arvoitus», *Tiede 2000*, 7 (1986), 1: 33.

Räty, Arvi, »Salapoliisityötä filosofin jäljillä», *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, 25
July 1986.

346. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Huomautuksia psykologian filosofiasta 1* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1988).
271 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-0-14777-X.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of *Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie 1*, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (first pub. 1980).

Reviews:

Rauhala, Lauri, »Psykologian käsitteiden juurilla», *Psykologia* 24 (1989): 145–147.

Räty, Arvi, »Sekaannusten selvittelyä», *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, 2 February 1989.

347. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, *Huomautuksia psykologian filosofiasta 2* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1989).
345 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-0-15467-9.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of *Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie 2* and *Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie 1*, eds. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman (first pub. 1980–1982).

Reviews:

Räty, Arvi, »Kielipelit», *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, 16 November 1989.

Saari, Heikki, »Psykologian filosofiaa», *Psykologia* 24 (1989): 494–495.

348. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, »Wittgensteinin kirjeet Norman Malcolmille», in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: muistelma* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1990): 131–206.

Finnish translation by Pentti Polameri of »Wittgenstein's Letters to Norman Malcolm» (first pub. 1984). – Reprinted 1999.

349. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, »Kirjeitä Ludwig Wittgensteinilta Georg Henrik von Wrightille», in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: muistelmia* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1990): 207–241.

Finnish translation by Pentti Polameri of »Some Hitherto Unpublished Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Georg Henrik von Wright» (first pub. 1983). – Reprinted 1999.

350. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, »Filosofia», *Synteesi* 10 (1991), 1–2: 1–18.

Finnish translation by Heikki Nyman of »Philosophie: §§ 86–93 (S. 405–435) aus dem sogenannten 'Big Typescript' (Katalognummer 213)», ed. Heikki Nyman (first pub. 1989).

351. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, »Otteita Wittgensteinin muistiinpanoista», *niin & näin* 5 (1998), 3: 12–13.

Finnish translation by Oskari Kuusela of excerpts from *Denkbewegungen: Tagebücher 1930–1932, 1936–1937*, ed. Ilse Somavilla (first pub. 1997).

352. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Logistisk filosofi», *Nya Argus* 31 (1938): 175–177.

A short popular account of logical positivism, with special reference to the
T r a c t a t u s .

353. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Georg Christoph Lichtenberg als Philosoph», *Theoria* 8 (1942): 201–217.

353a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Georg Christoph Lichtenberg als Philosoph«, in *Erkenntnis als Lebensform: zeitgenössische Wanderungen eines philosophischen Logikers* (Wien: Böhlau, 1995): 77–92.
Reprint of item 353 with a postscript written in 1993.

Compares the *Tractatus* with the tone and approach of Lichtenberg's writings.

354. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Den logiska empirismen: en huvudriktning i modern filo-sofi* (Helsingfors: Söderström, 1943).
188 p.

354a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Looginen empirismi: eräs nykyisen filosofian pääsuunta* (Helsinki: Otava, 1945).
187 p. Finnish translation of item 354 by Hilppa Kinon.

354b. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Looginen empirismi: eräs nykyisen filosofian pääsuunta«, in *Logiikka ja humanismi* (Helsinki: Otava, 1998): 15–154.
Reprint of item 354a.

An introductory work on logical empiricism, with many references to the *Tractatus* and W.'s influence upon the Vienna Circle. The possibility of W.'s later work remaining unpublished until his death is already mentioned.

355. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Form and Content in Logic: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered on 26 May 1949 in the University of Cambridge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949).
34 p.

355a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Form and Content in Logic«, in *Logical Studies* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: Humanities Press, 1957): 1–21.

In the *Tractatus*, the notion of logical truth is explained through the notion of tautology, which is itself based on the notion of a truth-function. The strengths and weaknesses of this theory are discussed.

356. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Ludwig Wittgenstein: en biografisk skiss», *Ajatus* 18 (1954): 4–23.
- 356a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Biographical Sketch», *Philosophical Review* 64 (1955): 527–545.
English version of item 356.
- 356b. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »A Biographical Sketch», in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958): 1–22.
Revised version of item 356a, incorporating the corrections in item 357.
- 356c. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Biographische Betrachtung», in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Schriften*, Beiheft 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1960): 82–99.
German translation of item 356b by Arvid Sjögren.
- 356d. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Schizzo biografico», in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein* (Milano: Bompiani, 1960): 7–35.
Italian translation of item 356b by Bruno Oddera.
- 356e. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Biographische Skizze», in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Ein Erinnerungsbuch* (München: Oldenbourg, 1961): 7–23.
Reprint of item 356c.
- 356f. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Esquema biográfico», in G. H. von Wright, Norman Malcolm and David Pole, *Las filosofías de Ludwig Wittgenstein* (Barcelona: Oikos-Tau, 1966): 23–38.
Spanish translation of item 356b by Ricardo Jordana.
- 356g. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Biographical Sketch», in K. T. Fann (ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy* (New York: Dell, 1967): 13–29.
Revised version of item 356b.

- 356h. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Biografisk skiss», in Norman Malcolm, *Minnen av Wittgenstein* (Helsingfors: Schildts; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1967): 7–31.
Swedish translation of item 356b by Thomas Warburton.
- 356i. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Kort levensbericht», in Norman Malcolm, *Wittgenstein: een biografisch essay* (Amsterdam: Van Ditmar, 1968): 7–33.
Dutch translation of item 356b by Tony Bartels.
- 356j. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Notice biographique», in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *De la certitude* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976): 7–30.
French translation of item 356b by Guy Durand.
- 356k. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Biographical Sketch», in K. T. Fann (ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy* (Hassocks: Harvester Press; Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978): 13–29.
Reprint of item 356g.
- 356l. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Biographische Skizze», in Norman Malcolm, *Erinnerungen an Wittgenstein* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987): 82–99.
Reprint of item 356c.
- 356m. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Elämäkerran luonnos», in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: muistelma* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1990): 7–30.
Finnish translation of item 356g by Pentti Polameri.
- 356n. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Životopisná crta», in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein v spomienkach* (Bratislava: Archa, 1993): 7–29.
Slovak translation of item 356g by Dezider Kamhal.
- 356o. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Biographical Sketch», in F. A. Flowers III (ed.), *Portraits of Wittgenstein*, vol. 1 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999): 62–77.
Reprint of item 356g.

357. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Note», *Philosophical Review* 65 (1956): 298.

Corrections to item 356.

358. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Logik, filosofi och språk: strömningar och gestalter i modern filosofi* (Helsingfors: Söderström; Stockholm: Bonnier, 1957).
250 p.

358a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Logiikka, filosofia ja kieli: ajattelijoita ja ajatussuuntia nykyajan filosofiassa* (Helsinki: Otava, 1958).
242 p. Finnish translation of item 358 by Jaakko Hintikka and Tauno Nyberg.

An introductory work on analytic philosophy intended for popular audiences, with many references to both W.'s early and late philosophies.

359. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Ludwig Wittgenstein och den moderna filosofin», *Dagens Nyheter*, 14 March 1957.

359a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Ludwig Wittgenstein ja nykyajan filosofia», *Uusi Suomi*, 7 April 1957.
Finnish version of item 359.

A popular presentation of the outlines of W.'s personality and life.

360. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgensteins *Tractatus*», *Dagens Nyheter*, 16 March 1957.

360a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgensteinin *Tractatus*», *Uusi Suomi*, 10 April 1957.
Finnish version of item 360.

A popular presentation of the *Tractatus*, including the problem of linguistic meaning in general, and the idea that »logical truth buys its aprioric validity at the price of vacuity».

361. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Filosofins passion och problem», *Dagens Nyheter*, 19 March 1957.

361a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Filosofian ongelma», *Uusi Suomi*, 14 April 1957.
Finnish version of item 361.

A popular presentation of the metaphilosophical commitments of W.'s post-*Tractatus* thinking, including its relation to ordinary language philosophy and its rejection of empirical, logical and mystical roles for philosophy.

362. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889–1951)», in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. 23 (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1959): 692.

363. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Moralisten och syndabocken», *Dagens Nyheter*, 21 July 1959.

An intervention in a discussion on the merits of W.'s philosophy among Ingemar Hedenius and other Swedish philosophers.

364. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Logik, filosofi och språk: strömningar och gestalter i modern filosofi* (Stockholm: Aldus/Bonnier, 1965).
233 p.

364a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Logiikka, filosofia ja kieli: ajattelijoita ja ajatussuuntia nykyajan filosofiassa* (Helsinki: Otava, 1968).
263 p. Finnish translation of item 364 by Jaakko Hintikka and Tauno Nyberg.

- 364b. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Logik, filosofi och språk: strömningar och gestalter i modern filosofi* (Lund: Doxa, 1980).
233 p.; ISBN 91-578-0100-2. Reprint of item 364.
- 364c. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Logiikka, filosofia ja kieli: ajattelijoita ja ajatussuuntia nykyajan filosofiassa», in *Logiikka ja humanismi* (Helsinki: Otava, 1998): 155–359.
Reprint of item 364a.
- Revised and expanded edition of item 358.
365. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Die Entstehung des *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*», in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Briefe an Ludwig von Ficker* (Salzburg: Müller, 1969): 71–110.
German translation of item 365a by Walter Methlagl.
- 365a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »The Origin of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*», in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Prototractatus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971): 1–34.
- 365b. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »The Origin of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*», in C. Grant Luckhardt (ed.), *Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives* (Hassocks: Harvester Press; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979): 99–137.
Revised version of item 365a.
366. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein's Views on Probability», *Revue internationale de philosophie* 23 (1969): 259–283.
- 366a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein's Views on Probability», in Gilles-Gaston Granger (ed.), *Wittgenstein et le problème d'une philosophie de la science* (Paris: CNRS, 1970).
Reprint of item 366.

In the *Tractatus*, W. defined probability as a ratio of the measures of ranges of propositions. This may be seen as the final outcome of efforts to give a foundation in pure logic to the »classic« Laplacean definition of probability. In posthumously published writings from 1929–1932, W. explored the view that the measures of the ranges are hypothetical magnitudes chosen so as to give an optimal accord with statistical experience. Under this view, probability can be said to demarcate a border between chance and law. Unlike many later writers, W. did not regard the range-theory of probability as a basis for inductive logic or a theory of confirmation. The probability of a hypothesis on given evidence is a different kind of probability from that of the calculus and defies numerical measurement.

367. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »The Wittgenstein Papers«, *Philosophical Review* 78 (1969): 483–503.

367a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »The Wittgenstein Papers«, in S. G. Shanker (ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, vol. 5 (London: Croom Helm, 1986): 1–21.

Revised version of item 367.

367b. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »The Wittgenstein Papers«, in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993): 480–510.

Revised version of item 367a.

A complete catalogue of W.'s manuscripts and typewritten documents in the library of Trinity College at Cambridge. The catalogue is followed by a historical note; by a description of the systems of classification adopted; and by a number of comments on individual texts.

368. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889–1951)«, in E. T. Williams and Helen M. Palmer (eds.), *The Dictionary of National Biography 1951–1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971): 1068–1071.

369. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein on Certainty», in G. H. von Wright (ed.), *Problems in the Theory of Knowledge* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972): 47–60.

369a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein varmuudesta», in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Varmuudesta* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1975): 9–30.

Finnish translation of item 369 by Heikki Nyman.

An essay discussing the main themes of W.'s critique of Moore in *On Certainty*, concluding with considerations of W's notion of »world pictures». The author's view is that this notion bears interestingly on the sociology of scientific knowledge and T. S. Kuhn's notion of paradigm shifts.

370. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Some Observations on Modal Logic and Philosophical Systems», in Raymond E. Olson and Anthony M. Paul (eds.), *Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972): 17–26.

Includes discussion of W.'s view of modality in the *Tractatus*.

371. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times», in Elisabeth Leinfellner et al. (eds.), *Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1978): 73–78.

371a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein und seine Zeit», in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Schriften*, Beiheft 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979): 103–114.

German translation of item 371 by Joachim Schulte.

371b. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein suhteessa aikaansa», in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Yleisiä huomautuksia* (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: WSOY, 1979): 11–27.

Finnish translation of item 359 by Heikki Nyman.

- 371c. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times«, in Brian McGuinness (ed.), *Wittgenstein and His Times* (Oxford: Blackwell; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982): 108–120.
Reprint of item 371.
- 371d. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein et son temps«, in Jean-Pierre Cometti (ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein* (Marseille: Sud, 1986): 173–188.
French translation of item 371 by Jean-Pierre Cometti.
- 371e. Wright, H. G. von, »Wittgenstein e il suo tempo«, in Marilena Andronico, Diego Marconi and Carlo Penco (eds.), *Capire Wittgenstein* (Genova: Marietti, 1988): 19–30.
Italian translation of item 371 by Joachim Schulte.
- 371f. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times«, in Brian McGuinness (ed.), *Wittgenstein and His Times* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1998): 108–120.
Reprint of item 371c.
- 371g. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times«, in F. A. Flowers III (ed.), *Portraits of Wittgenstein*, vol. 4 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999): 206–214.
Reprint of item 371.

According to W., when language malfunctions and causes philosophical problems, there must be something wrong in the life of the community using the language. W.'s remarks in *Culture and Value* show how he rejected the scientific-technological civilization of industrialized societies, which he regarded as the decay of a culture, following Spengler's philosophy of history.

372. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »The Origin and Composition of Wittgenstein's *Investigations*«, in C. Grant Luckhardt (ed.), *Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives* (Hassocks: Harvester Press; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979): 138–160.

373. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).
218 p.; ISBN 0-631-13099-3 (Blackwell); 0-8166-1210-2 (University of Minnesota Press).
- 373a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Wittgenstein* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1983).
269 p.; ISBN 88-15-00320-7. Italian translation of item 373 by Alberto Emiliani.
- 373b. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Wittgenstein* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986).
225 p.; ISBN 3-518-57815-4. German translation of item 373 by Joachim Schulte.
- 373c. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Wittgenstein* (Mauvezin: Trans-Europ-Repress, 1986).
229 p.; ISBN 2-905670-18-5. French translation of item 373 by Élisabeth Rigal.

Incorporates material from items 356g, 365b, 366, 367, 369, 370, 371 and 372.

Reviews:

[anonymous], *Philosophische Rundschau* 34 (1987): 158–160.

Beardsmore, R. W., *Times Higher Education Supplement*, 3 December 1982.

Emiliani, Alberto, *Lingua e stile* 18 (1983): 580–584.

Engel, Pascal, *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger* 109 (1984): 132–133.

Finch, Henry Le Roy, *Philosophical Books* 25 (1985): 162–164.

Kerr, Fergus, *Heythrop Journal* 26 (1985): 466–470.

McFetridge, Ian, »Recent Work on Wittgenstein«, *Philosophical Quarterly* 34 (1984): 69–73.

Merkel, Reinhard, »'I'll teach you differences': Georg Henrik von Wrights Wittgenstein-Essays«, *Merkur* 41 (1987): 609–613.

Morawetz, Thomas, *International Studies in Philosophy* 18 (1986), 3: 110–111.

Nystrand, Stig, »G. H. von Wright om Wittgenstein«, *Vasabladet*, 15 December 1983.

Parret, Herman, »Wittgenstein II bis», *Tijdschrift voor filosofie* 45 (1983): 261–290.

Waldenfels, Bernhard, *Philosophische Rundschau* 34 (1987): 159–160.

374. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Intellectual Autobiography», in Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn (eds.), *The Philosophy of G. H. von Wright* (La Salle: Open Court, 1989): 1–55.

374a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »The Strongest Impression Any Man Ever Made on Me», in F. A. Flowers III (ed.), *Portraits of Wittgenstein*, vol. 4 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999): 132–135.

Reprint of excerpts from item 374.

Discusses von Wright's relations with W.

375. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »McGuinness on von Wright on Wittgenstein», in Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn (eds.), *The Philosophy of G. H. von Wright* (La Salle: Open Court, 1989): 762–766.

Reply to Brian McGuinness, »Von Wright on Wittgenstein», in the same volume.

376. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein and the Twentieth Century», in Leila Haaparanta, Martin Kusch and Ilkka Niiniluoto (eds.), *Language, Knowledge and Intentionality: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1990): 47–67.

376a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein och det tjugonde århundradet», in Lars Hertzberg (ed.), *Essäer om Wittgenstein* (Stockholm: Thales, 1992): 271–291.

Swedish translation of item 376 by Elisabeth von Wright.

376b. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein ja 20. vuosisata», in *Minervan pöllö: esseitä vuosilta 1987–1991* (Helsinki: Otava, 1992): 97–118.

Finnish translation of item 376 by Heikki Nyman.

- 376c. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein and the Twentieth Century», in *The Tree of Knowledge and Other Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 1993): 83–102.
Reprint of item 376.
- 376d. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »... ett förändrat sätt att tänka och leva», in *Myten om framsteget: tankar 1987–1992 med en intellektuell självbiografi* (Helsingfors: Söderström; Stockholm: Bonnier, 1993): 91–112.
Reprint of item 376a.
- 376d. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »... en endret måte å tenke og leve på», in *Myten om fremskrittet: tanker 1987–1992, med en intellektuell selvbiografi* (Oslo: Cappelen, 1994): 84–106.
Norwegian translation of item 376 by Knut Olav Åmås and Rolf Larsen.
- 376f. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein og det tyvende århundrede», in *Myten om fremskridtet: tanker 1987–92 med en intellektuel selvbiografi* (København: Munksgaard, 1994): 90–110.
Danish translation of item 376 by Knud Michelsen and Marianne Rosen.
- 376g. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein und das zwanzigste Jahrhundert», in *Erkenntnis als Lebensform: zeitgenössische Wanderungen eines philosophischen Logikers* (Wien: Böhlau, 1995): 120–144.
German translation of item 376 by Joachim Schulte.
- 376h. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein and the Twentieth Century», in Rosaria Egidi (ed.), *Wittgenstein: Mind and Language* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995): 1–19.
Reprint of item 376.
- 376i. Wright, G. H. von, »Wittgenstein ja kahekümnes sajand», in *Minerva öökull* (Tallinn: Vagabund, 1996): 239–263.
Estonian translation of item 376 by Jaan Kaplinski.
- 376j. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein ja 20. vuosisata», in *Tieto ja ymmärrys* (Helsinki: Otava, 1999): 202–221.
Reprint of item 376b.

376k. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstejn i dvadcatyj vek», *Voprosy filosofii* (2001), 7: 33–46.

Russian translation of item 376 by M. S. Kozlova and E. B. Kozlov.

376l. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein and the Twentieth Century», in Stuart Shanker and David Kilfoyle (ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments: Second Series*, vol. 4 (London: Routledge, 2002): 3–30.

Reprint of item 376.

W. never shared the typically twentieth-century belief in progress, science and technology. On the contrary, for him philosophy was a means of actively searching for »a changed mode of thought and life» in protest at these trends.

377. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Vetenskap, industri och rättfärdighet: en kommentar till ett Wittgensteincitat», *Dagens Nyheter*, 16 September 1991.

A commentary on the Gulf War and the »new world order», taking as its point of departure W.'s remark in *Culture and Value* that science and industry seemingly decide wars.

378. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »The Troubled History of Part II of the *Investigations*», *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 42 (1992): 181–192.

378a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Teil II der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*: eine beschwerliche Geschichte», in Eike von Savigny and Oliver R. Scholz (ed.), *Wittgenstein über die Seele* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995): 12–23.

German translation of item 378 by Eike von Savigny.

The typescripts from which both parts of W.'s *Philosophical Investigations* were printed are now lost. Of the typescript for Part I there exists a second copy, but not so of the typescript for Part II. There is, however, a manuscript in W.'s hand which contains the whole of the printed Part II – and some additional material. A comparison of this manuscript with the printed text reveals some interesting discrepancies. They are noted in the paper. Moreover, a detailed comparison is made in a Postscript between the printed Preface of the *Investigations* and another, obviously earlier, version of it. Both versions are dated »Cambridge, January 1945» – but the printed one was probably not prepared until two years later. [AA]

379. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Intet är fördolt», *Dialoger* 22–23 (1992): 43–45.

379a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Nothing Is Hidden», in Bo Göranson (ed.), *Skill, Technology and Enlightenment: On Practical Philosophy* (London: Springer, 1995): 183–185.
English version of item 379.

Brief remarks on W., Gödel and Turing, and their respective contributions to the philosophy of mathematics.

380. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »On Colour: A Logico-Philosophical Fantasy», in *Six Essays in Philosophical Logic* (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1996): 9–16.

A discussion of the problem of colour incompatibility as treated by W. in the *Tractatus*. Although this does not solve the problem as such, we can imagine foreign tribes whose »colour world» consists of logically independent units. The conceptual colour maps of such tribes can be used to construct truth tables for basic colour concepts.

381. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein and Tradition», *Colloquium Philosophicum* 2 (1997): 32–46.

381a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein and Tradition«, in Rosaria Egidi (ed.), *In Search of a New Humanism: The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999): 35–46.
Reprint of item 381.

381b. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein og tradisjonen«, in Ståle R. S. Finke and Lars Fr. H. Svendsen (ed.), *Wittgenstein og den europeiske filosofien: tekst og kontekst* (Oslo: Akribe, 2001): 17–29.
Norwegian translation of item 381.

An essay assessing W.'s relations to the grand Western philosophical tradition, and especially to Cartesian philosophy of psychology.

382. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Philosophy: A Guide for the Perplexed?«, in Daniel Dahlström (ed.), *Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy*, vol. 8 (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000).

As regards philosophers' views of the relation between philosophy and science, two main lines existed in the twentieth century – one stemming from W., another from Russell. The Russellian view is that science seeks »knowledge« of »truth«, while W. emphasizes the philosophical »understanding« of »meaning« (significance). The author suggests that knowledge (and Russellian philosophy), nourished by scientific progress, has hypertrophied at the expense of understanding (and W.ian philosophy).

383. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Mitt liv som jag minns det* (Helsingfors: Söderström; Stockholm: Bonnier, 2001).
327 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-52-1964-7 (Söderström); 91-0-057681-6 (Bonnier).

383a. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, *Elämäni niin kuin sen muistan* (Helsinki: Otava, 2002).

348 p.: illus.; ISBN 951-1-18058-4. Finnish translation of item 371 by Iiro Kuuranne.

This autobiography of von Wright contains a number of references to his relationship with W. and to his work in editing W.'s papers.

Reviews:

Apelkvist, Björn, *Horisont* 49 (2002), 2: 83–84.

Braw, Christian, »'Mitt gamla jag får jag aldrig tillbaka'», *Finsk tidskrift* 251–252 (2002): 290–304.

Helenius, Henrik, »En filosof med öppna ögon», *Nordisk tidskrift för vetenskap, konst och industri* 78 (2002), 1: 94–96.

Hämäläinen, Nora, »Ett förnuftigt liv», *Ny tid* (2001), 50: 5.

Willner, Sven, »Om von Wright och Wittgenstein», *Nya Argus* 94 (2001): 165–166, 175.

384. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »On Wittgenstein», *Philosophical Investigations* 24 (2001): 177–179.

A brief contribution to a symposium in which noted W. scholars discuss their relations to W. and his place in contemporary philosophy.

385. WRIGHT, G. H. VON, »Wittgenstein», *Revista de teorie sociala* 3 (2001), 1: 39–52.

386. ÅMÅS, KNUT OLAV and LARSEN, ROLF, »On Intellectual Independence and Decency: Georg Henrik von Wright and Knut Erik Tranøy in Conversation with Knut Olav Åmås and Rolf Larsen», in Kjell S. Johannessen, Rolf Larsen and Knut Olav Åmås (eds.), *Wittgenstein and Norway* (Oslo: Solum, 1994): 163–180.

A 1991 interview with von Wright concerning W.'s personality; his influence on von Wright's own thought; W.'s role in contemporary philosophy; and von Wright's work in editing the W. papers.